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ENTER THE DRAGON'S LAIR: THE NEW
SOCIALISM AND PRIVATE PROPERTY
OWNERSHIP IN THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC
OF CHINA
MICHAEL T. STANCZYK*
In making the transition from a socialist command economy to
a market driven capitalist economy, the main focus is the
privatization of property.' In order to foster a healthy, robust
market system, secure private property rights are a necessity. 2
The People's Republic of China ("PRC") has recently passed an
amendment to its constitution granting, for the first time,
individuals the right to own property. 3
* J.D., June 2007, St. John's University School of Law; B.A. Economics and Political
Science, University of Rochester.
1 See Janos Kornai, What the Change of System from Socialism to Capitalism Does
and Does Not Mean, 14 J. ECON. PERSP. 27, 32 (2000) (stating that a successful transition
to capitalism requires "providing constitutional protections for private property" and the
promotion of privatization); see also Akos R6na-Tas, The First Shall Be Last?
Entrepreneurship and Communist Cadres in the Transition from Socialism, 100 AM. J.
SOC. 40, 40 (1994) (explaining that the change from socialism to capitalism requires
"profound change[s] in property relations").
2 See Jonas Alsen, An Introduction to Chinese Property Law, 20 MD. J. INT'L L. &
TRADE 1, 3 ("A well-functioning property rights system is vital for a market economy.
Without a credible legal system that protects ownership rights and provides stable legal
rules, people will be less inclined to invest in long-term projects when return on the
investment might take many years. To sustain growth and prosperity, property rights
require the protection of fair and stable laws. In a market economy, it is the task of the
government to provide this security."); see also Chenglin Liu, Informal Rules, Transaction
Costs, and the Failure of the "Takings" Law in China, 29 HASTINGS INT'L & COMP. L. REV.
1, 6 (2005) ("For developing economies, the implication of the NIE [New Institutional
Economics] theory is that the first step to economic growth is to establish a well-defined
and enforceable property rights framework. During this process, developing economies
must be fully aware that while formal rules on property rights are relatively easy to
establish (chiefly through legal transplantation), informal norms that create indirect
property rights protections are not.").
3 This paper was written before the passage of the new property rights law and
examines China's property system prior to its enactment. This paper will not provide an
analysis of the new property rights law. It is too early to witness the full effect the law
may have. This paper concerns itself with the conditions in China that necessitated the
passage of the law and some problems in the China's property system that the law may
possibly rectify in the future. See China's New Revolution, ECONOMIST, March 10, 2007,
which describes how the new law was passed and that it is deemed a "great symbolic
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Two different approaches to privatization exist. The first was
exemplified after the fall of the Soviet Union, when the world
witnessed the so-called "big bang" method of privatization, which
utilizes "shock therapy" - rapidly transforming a nation from a
socialist state to a privately owned, western style market
economy. 4 When "shock therapy" is used the government enacts a
switch of control over ownership to individuals and corporations
in a very short time period. While this method quickly transfers
a huge amount of wealth to private parties, showcased by the
overwhelming amount of young billionaires in Russia at the
present time, it carries with it many negative externalities.
While the more prevalent model, this "shock therapy" method of
privatization is fraught with difficulties.5
The second method of privatization, the one that China has
engineered, has been deemed "socialism with Chinese
victory for economic reform and the rule of law." Id. However, it is not as comprehensive
in the grant of protections to individuals as hoped. The law that was passed is a watered
down version of a full private property rights law that was contemplated earlier and is
still needed in China. However, it is a start and the process of privatization will continue
in the future. The passage of the property law "may have started a process... that will
one day change [China] completely." Id. Prior to the passage of the new law a draft
property rights law was accepted with a planned enactment date of March 2006, but after
certain Marxist ideologues voiced their concerns about how the proposed draft strayed too
far from the socialist idealistic underpinnings of the nation, the draft law was rejected. It
fueled many outside opinions and heated debates. See Joseph Kahn, At a Secret Meeting,
Chinese Analysts Clashed Over Reforms, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 6, 2006, at A14, stating:
Officials and scholars who had been convened last month to advise senior Chinese
leaders disagreed sharply on how to advance economic and legal reforms, according to
minutes of the private meeting that have been leaked on the Internet. They also
expressed anxiety about what one official called "unprecedented controversy and
dissent" among China's elite.... Last month, the party-controlled legislature
postponed consideration of a broad property-rights measure that had been expected
to become law.
While it is true that prior to the enactment of the new property rights law China allowed
ownership of certain types of property in the past, such as improved structures
(buildings), this note will concentrate mainly on real estate. Id.
4 See Vladimir Popov, Shock Therapy Versus Gradualism: The End of the Debate
(Explaining the Magnitude of Transformational Recession), 42 COMP. ECON. STUD. 1, 2
(2000) (highlighting differences between radical and immediate changes favored by "shock
therapy" as opposed to more cautious approach of "gradualism"); see also Shock Therapy
(Economics), http://en.wikipedia.org/wikiShock therapy_..%28economics%29 (last visited
Apr. 6, 2007) (noting that shock therapy often implements changes so rapidly that the
economy is unable to keep up).
5 See Pamela Phan, Enriching the Land or the Political Elite? Lessons from China on
Democratization of the Urban Renewal Process, 14 PAC. RIM L. & POLY 607, 612 (2005)
[hereinafter Phan I] (discussing social and political unrest prevalent in the Soviet model
of privatization); see also Janine R. Wedel, The Harvard Boys Do Russia, NATION, June 1,
1998, at 11 (citing issue with privatization of rampant inflation which can wipe out the
savings of individual investors).
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characteristics."6 This is a gradual, pragmatic approach to
privatization. 7 It is still an ongoing process in China, started in
1978, which peaked when the PRC Constitution was amended to
recognize formal private property ownership rights.8 However,
this does not mark the end of the privatization process. It will be
just one step in the furthering of the continued pragmatic
"socialism with Chinese characteristics." 9
China has been expanding economically to the bewilderment of
many economists and legal scholars.10 It has not followed any
clear economic theories and has had little, if any, assistance from
legal constructs in its furious expansion."' It is itself creating
new economic and legal growth models which will be studied and
6 See Edward Cody, China's Premier Calls Democracy a Distant Goal, WASH. POST,
Feb. 28, 2007, at A13 (stating China's Premier, Jan Wen Jiabao, used term "socialism
with Chinese characteristics" to describe China's future).
7 See Robert H. McGuckin & Sean M. Dougherty, Restructuring Chinese Enterprises:
The Effects of Federalism and Privatization Initiatives on Business Performance, THE
CONF. BOARD, 7 (2002) (finding China's experiment with privatization to have occurred
systematically over the past twenty years); see also Matthew D. Bersani, Privatization
and the Creation of Stock Companies in China, 1993 COLUM. BUS. L. REV. 301, 304 (1993)
("The term 'privatization' means something very different in the Chinese context than in
Eastern Europe, South America, or other places where privatization has occurred.
Privatization in China does not involve a radical departure from past practices, inspired
by political necessity. Rather, it is the continuation of a process begun 15 years ago, and is
motivated largely by excessive capital accumulation by private individuals in the PRC,
rather than by the state's dire economic needs.... In the PRC, however, the government
retains a controlling interest in 'privatized' entities, so that privatization results not in
the sale of state assets to private interests, but in the absorption of private funds by state-
controlled enterprises.").
8 See McGuckin & Dougherty, supra note 7, at 8 (explaining that small businesses
with less than eight employees were first to be privatized in the late 70's and early 80's);
see also Joseph Kahn, China Moves to Protect Property, But the Fine Print Has a Caveat,
N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 23, 2003, at Al (describing People's Republic of China's move to amend
their constitution to protect private property).
9 Cody, supra note 6, at A13 (referring to China's Premier Jan Wen Jiabao's use of
term "socialism with Chinese characteristics" to describe China's future).
10 See David Barboza, A Rapid Rebound: Chinese Stocks Set Record, N.Y. TIMES, Mar.
22, 2007, at C12 (finding that Chinese market is booming and Chinese stock market grew
more than any other market last year); see also Joseph Kahn, India, China at Business
Forum's Forefront: Growth in Asia is Expected to Dominate the World's Economic Focus in
the 21s, Century, L.A. TIMES, Jan. 30, 2006, at C7 (mentioning China and India have
taken center stage as world's fastest developing nations because they have the greatest
economic growth).
11 See Joseph Kahn, China Enacts Law to Protect Property, INT'L HERALD TRIB., Mar.
17, 2007, at 6 (noting that China enacted its first law to protect private property only
after twenty-five years of unprecedented growth); see also The World's Largest Economies,
ECONOMIST, Apr. 1, 2006 ("By 2020, China will narrowly outstrip the United States in
GDP, according to the Economist Intelligence Unit, a sister organization of The
Economist. The forecast uses purchasing-power parities (PPP), which strip out price
differences between countries, rather than market exchange-rates to convert national
GDPs into a common currency.").
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applied in the future. 12 This note will give a brief tour of the
structure of the property system existing in China before the
enactment of the amendment to the PRC constitution granting
individuals the right to own property, and to shed some light on
areas that need improvement going forward.
Part I of this note will examine the political and legal system of
China in order to provide background information regarding how
the new property law arose. Part II will provide an overview of
the property system in China, look at the de jure and de facto
ownership interests that have arisen, and how the property law
was necessary to delineate and solidify these interests. Part III
will delve into two of the main problems in China's property
regime; first, the troubling registration system, and second, the
corruption, land takings, and mistreatment of the working class.
Part IV will examine the economic effects that the property
rights law, once fully implemented, may have on the People's
Republic of China.
I. CHINA'S STRUCTURE OF GOVERNMENT AND LEGAL SYSTEM
The People's Republic of China utilizes a unitary form of
government, in contrast to the federal system of the United
States.13 A unitary form of government has one central
government directly controlling all lower levels of government. 14
As of late, however, the lower levels of government in the PRC
have begun to operate as separate entities.15 This occurred
12 See Mitchell Silk & Richard Malish, Symposium, Legal Implications of a Rising
China: Are Chinese Companies Taking Over the World?, 7 CHI. J. INT'L L. 105, 109 (2006)
(noting that managers of multinational corporations are already reading about and trying
to learn from China's growth); see also The Tiger in Front, ECONOMIST, Mar. 5, 2005
(positing that "India can learn much from China's [rapid economic growth]").
13 See Christopher Duncan, Out of Conformity: China's Capacity to Implement World
Trade Organization Dispute Settlement Body Decisions After Accession, 18 AM. U. INT'L L.
REV. 399, 413 (noting that control of China's government is located in the central
government); see also Katherine Wilhelm, Rethinking Property Rights in Urban China, 9
UCLA J. INT'L L. & FOREIGN AFF. 227, 235 (2004) ("Departments at the provincial, city,
and county levels correspond to the ministries in Beijing and take direction from them.").
14 See Duncan, supra note 13, at 413 (comparing China's government to a pyramid,
with the central government passing down orders from the top); but see Wilhelm, supra
note 13, at 235 (stating that central control of local decisions has became less pervasive in
the past twenty years).
15 See Wilhelm, supra note 13, at 235 (citing KENNETH LIEBERTHAL, GOVERNING
CHINA: FROM REVOLUTION THROUGH REFORM 249 (1995)) (finding that local governments
are gaining control of how initiatives are carried out even if they are not determining
what initiatives should be carried out).
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2008] ENTER THE DRAGON'S LAIR
because the central government set tax quotas that each lower
level of government had to meet, and after this tax goal was met,
any surplus tax revenue could be kept by the local governments
and used in any manner it saw fit.16 Thus, local leaders have
essentially been granted an "autonomy" allowing discretion in
determining their means of operation.17 The central government
in the PRC is concerned with only the ends, that a certain
amount of revenue be collected, and not the means used to collect
such revenue, which is left to the localities to determine.18
Therefore, each individual locality exists as a separately run
enterprise while encompassed under the command of the central
state government. Local government officials act in a capacity
akin to that of chief executive officers of large not-for-profit
corporations in the United States.19
The highest court in the PRC is called the Supreme People's
Court, under which all other courts are organized, however, each
court is under the command of the local government in which it
sits.20 The presiding judges in the courts of the PRC are
employed by the legislative "branch" of the government. 21
Therefore the concept of "judicial review" of legislation does not
exist in the People's Republic of China.22 The primary function of
16 See Wilhelm, supra note 13, at 235-36 (citing KENNETH LIEBERTHAL, GOVERNING
CHINA: FROM REVOLUTION THROUGH REFORM 249 (1995)) (explaining that the local
governments in China have gained power as a result of being allowed to share in tax
revenues).
17 See id. at 236 (citing KENNETH LIEBERTHAL, GOVERNING CHINA: FROM REVOLUTION
THROUGH REFORM 316 (1995)) ("Financial independence has led to a considerable
measure of policy independence.").
18 See id. at 236 (citing KENNETH LIEBERTHAL, GOVERNING CHINA: FROM REVOLUTION
THROUGH REFORM 218 (1995)) (including such choices as localities' own strategies for
meeting the targets based on the priorities and concerns of local government).
19 See Liu, supra note 2, at 7 (comparing officials' goals and means used in obtaining
them).
20 See Vernon Mei-Ying Hung, China's WTO Commitment on Independent Judicial
Review: Impact on Legal and Political Reform, 52 AM. J. COMP. L. 77, 77 (2004) (finding
local governments have control over the courts' "personnel and financial arrangements");
see also Wilhelm, supra note 13, at 236 (noting that judges are appointed by the local
governments and the government exploits this power, placing demands on their
appointees).
21 Wilhelm, supra note 13, at 236 (discussing the court system); see Randall
Peerenboom, Globalization, Path Dependency, and the Limits of Law: Administrative Law
Reform and Rule of Law in the People's Republic of China, 19 BERKELEY J. INT'L L. 161,
195 (2001) (observing practice of appointing judges may influence their decision-making
process).
22 See PATRICK A. RANDOLPH JR. & LOU JIANBO, CHINESE REAL ESTATE LAW 32
(Kluwer Law Int'l 2000) ("Unlike the American Constitution, the Chinese Constitution is
not a limit on the power of the state to govern, and the Chinese Supreme People's Court
plays no role in restricting the reach of governmental purpose."); see also Wilhelm, supra
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the courts in the PRC is to interpret legislation.23 The National
People's Congress is the sole holder of the power to review and, if
necessary, to overturn legislation. 24 Indeed, the same body that
is responsible for creating the laws is also charged with the
responsibility of reviewing such laws in order to ensure that they
are serving the proper purposes for which they were enacted. 25
Not surprisingly, the National People's Congress has never
struck down any piece of legislation.26
The legislative body of the PRC, the National People's
Congress, is in session for a mere two weeks every year.27
Although the Congress holds such a short session, the main
decision-making is performed during the rest of the year by the
Standing Committee, which is composed of select members of the
Congress. 28 In addition to the Standing Committee, the staff of
each Congressperson works year round to draft new legislation. 29
The members of Congress or their staff draft the majority of
the legislation in the PRC, however, over the last few years legal
practitioners have been incorporated into the drafting process. 30
note 13, at 236 (writing that courts do not have the power to annul local legislation).
23 Wilhelm, supra note 13, at 236 (discussing the political and legal context of China);
see RANDOLPH & JIANBO, supra note 22, at 32 (noting that courts refer questions of
interpretation back to the legislature).
24 Wilhelm, supra note 13, at 236; see RANDOLPH & JIANBO, supra note 22, at 32
(describing that the legislature has the power to review and interpret its own legislation).
25 See RANDOLPH & JIANBO, supra note 22, at 32 ("As a practical matter, the Supreme
People's Court will refer any significant questions of interpretation back over to the
government agency that established the policy in the first instance."); see also Daniel C.
Turack, The Projected Hong Kong Special Administrative Region Human Rights Record in
the Post-British Era, 31 AKRON L. REV. 77, 79-81 (writing that the National People's
Congress can interpret its own laws).
26 See Alsen, supra note 2, at 4 (observing that Standing Committee has not yet
exercised its power to review legislation); see also Pu Zengyuan, A Comparative
Perspective on the United States and Chinese Constitutions, 30 WM. & MARY L. REV. 867,
876 (1989) (reiterating there has been no instance of the Standing Committee reviewing
legislation).
27 See Wei Luo, How to Find the Law of the People's Republic of China: A Research
Guide and Selective Annotated Biography, 88 L. LIBR. J. 402, 405 (1996) (describing the
National People's Congress); see also Marc Rosenberg, The Chinese Legal System Made
Easy: A Survey of the Structure of Government, Creation of Legislation, and the Judicial
System Under the Constitution and Major Statutes of the People's Republic of China, 9 U.
MIAMI INT'L & COMP. L. REV. 225, 231 (2001) (explaining NPC's plenary session).
28 See Wu Jianduan, International Essay: A Milestone of Air Legislation in China-
Some Thoughts on the Civil Aviation Law of the People's Republic of China, 62 J. AIR L. &
COM. 823, 825 (writing that one function of Standing Committee is to supplement and
amend laws when NPC is not in session); see also Luo, supra note 27, at 405 (noting that
Standing Committee may amend or enact legislation when NPC is not in session).
29 Wilhelm, supra note 13, at 236 (describing China's legislative process); see
Rosenberg, supra note 27, at 231 (explaining details of NPC's plenary session).
30 See Michael C. Davis, Constitutionalism in Hong Kong: Politics Versus Economics,
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This trend has led to the recruitment of legal scholars from many
varied geographical communities and industries in the PRC.31
Input from these different areas was sought as a result of
pressure from large powerful interest groups representing the
private sector whose interests no doubt differ from that of the
PRC Communist Party.32
The Chinese Constitution is not seen as a high authority
providing protection for individual rights.33 It is viewed as a
policy document serving as the vehicle of party rule. 34 It is a
programmatic document, proscribing the ultimate goal of the
nation: strength and prosperity. 35 It serves as a roadmap to guide
the country towards further development socially, economically,
and politically. 36 China has been through five constitutions, the
current document having been instituted in 1982.37
18 U. PA. J. INT'L ECON. L. 157, 162 (1997) (noting that China was aware it needed to
include Hong Kong as participants in drafting of Constitution); see also Guiguo Wang &
Priscilla M F Leung, One Country, Two Systems: Theory into Practice, 7 PAC. RIM L. &
POL'Y J. 279, 293 (1998) (explaining that "outside consultation was sought" in the drafting
of Constitution).
31 See Wilhelm, supra note 13, at 236 (describing how legal scholars have been drawn
into the drafting process); see Davis, supra note 30, at 162 (listing 23 members from Hong
Kong and 36 members from China on the drafting committee); see also Wang & Leung,
supra note 30, at 293 (observing that the incorporation of outside legal advice has resulted
in a compromise of legal systems).
32 See Wilhelm, supra note 13, at 236 (explaining that these efforts were done in large
part to satisfy significant interest groups outside the Communist Party); see Davis, supra
note 30, at 162 (pointing to the large number of capitalists selected as outside
consultants).
33 See Alsen, supra note 2, at 4 (explaining Chinese Constitution is "more of a
guideline than a practical source of law."); see also Hiroshi Oda, An Examination of the
Unity and Diversity Within the Socialist Legal Family: The Procuracy and the Regular
Courts as Enforcers of the Constitutional Rule of Law: The Experience of East Asian
States, 61 TUL. L. REV. 1339, 1352 (1987) (proffering Constitution was instrument of
policy).
34 See Alsen, supra note 2, at 4 (emphasizing that because the Constitution is
instrument of policy, laws conflicting with party policy are amended); see also Oda, supra
note 33, at 1352 (writing that "law was an instrument to realize Party policy").
35 See David S. Bloch & Thomas TerBush, Democracy in the Cities: A New Proposal
for Chinese Reform, 33 CAL. W. INT'L L.J. 171, 181 (2003) (stating that China's economic
goal is to be "strong and prosperous"); S. David Cooper, The Dot.Communist Revolution:
Will the Internet Bring Democracy to China?, 18 UCLA PAC. BASIN L.J. 98, 100 (quoting
President Jiang Zemin's goal of a "strong and prosperous modernized country with a
higher degree of democracy and civilization").
36 See Alsen, supra note 2, at 4 (explaining goal of Chinese Constitution is to develop
China socially and politically); see also Phan I, supra note 5, at 612 ("The 1982
Constitution has thus been labeled a 'programmatic Constitution,' because it defines a
mission for the State and its citizens through which China may be transformed into a
strong and prosperous, culturally advanced, democratic socialist nation.").
37 See Alsen, supra note 2, at 4 (describing the history of PRC constitutions); Cymonie
Rowe, Note & Comment, Religious Freedom in the People's Republic of China, 2 ILSA J.
INT'L & COMP. L. 723, 728-31 (1996) (outlining historical development of China's
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The Constitution is supreme in theory only, in practice it
serves as little more than a rough guideline. Courts in ruling
cannot rely upon the Constitution, and the separate provisions of
the document have no power in their own right; rather each must
be given life through the enactment of subsequent legislation by
the Congress. 38 Articles 10 through 13 of Chapter 1 of the PRC
Constitution cover property rights.39 A plethora of laws are
currently in existence to enforce these articles. 40 An important
constitutional amendment, implemented in 1988, allowed for the
existence of private businesses for the first time. 41 All of the
different quasi-ownership interests that have arisen in China are
currently protected by this amendment.42
The legal system in China is one of civil law.43 The law in place
in China at the present time is an amalgamation of different
acts, the main one being the General Principles of Civil Law.44 To
constitutions).
38 See Alsen, supra note 2, at 4 (describing the Constitution as guideline requiring
further enactment of legislation); see also Hal Blanchard, Constitutional Revisionism in
the PRC: "Seeking Truth from Facts," 17 FLA. J. INT'L L. 365, 386-87 (2005) (explaining
need for further provisions to give Constitution effect).
39 See Alsen, supra note 2, at 5 (explaining legal rights and duties); see XIAN FA art.
10-14 (1982) (P.R.C.), available at http://english.people.com.cn/constitution
/constitution.html.
40 See Blanchard, supra note 38, at 386-87 (providing examples of provisions
enforcing property rights); Vincent W. Lau, Post-1997 Hong Kong: Will Sufficient
Educational Autonomy Remain to Safeguard Academic Freedom?, 20 B.C. INT'L & COMP.
L. REV. 187, 215 (1997) (speaking of laws intended to protect private property).
41 See Alsen, supra note 2, at 12 (stating that the 1988 amendment acknowledged the
existence of private business and granted it constitutional protection); see also XIAN FA
art. 11, Amend. 1 (1982) (P.R.C.) ("Article 11 of the Constitution shall include a new
paragraph which reads: 'The State permits the private sector of the economy to exist and
develop within the limits prescribed by law. The private sector of the economy is a
complement to the socialist public economy. The State protects the lawful rights and
interests of the private sector of the economy, and exercises guidance, supervision and
control over the private sector of the economy."').
42 This refers to ownership interests existing before the passage of the new property
rights law. It is unclear how these exist at the current moment. The passage of the law
would not have taken away any rights in property, but may have strengthened certain
rights already in existence. See Alsen, supra note 2, at 11-12 (pointing out that while
Chapter 2 of the P.R.C Constitution contains a list of legal rights and duties of Chinese
citizens, there are no property rights guarantees found anywhere except in Articles 10-13,
which were amended in 1988); see also XIAN FA art. 10-13 (1982) (P.R.C.).
43 See RANDOLPH & JIANBO, supra note 22, at 29 (noting that "the historical roots of
this system can be traced to the early 201b century, when the Emperor of the Qing
Dynasty designated Shen Jiaben to supervise the drawing of new forms of [civil, criminal
and procedural codes]."); see also Patrick A. Randolph, Jr., Commercial Leasing in China,
15 UCLA PAC. BAsIN. L. J. 86, 88 [hereinafter Commercial Leasing] (stating that it is
widely accepted that concepts of civil law are the basis of Chinese business law).
44 See RANDOLPH & JIANBO, supra note 22, at 30 (detailing different provisions of
General Principles of Civil Law: the doctrine of equality, the doctrines of voluntariness,
fairness, compensation of equal value, the doctrine of good faith, contracts, and civil acts;
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fully implement this act, the Supreme People's Court, in 1988,
issued an Interpretation of the General Principles of Civil Law,
which is commonly referred to as the "200 Clauses."45 While the
Supreme People's Court cannot review the laws, their
interpretations of the laws in China play a very crucial role.46 It
is their interpretations alone, and not any lower court decisions,
that have precedence in the Chinese legal system.47 Questions
may be posed to the Supreme People's Court as a formal appeal
from a lower court from one of the parties involved, or as a
request for guidance from the lower courts themselves before
they rule.48
II. PRC PROPERTY SYSTEM PRIOR TO PROPERTY LAW
A. Legal Background
Before the new amendment to the PRC Constitution allowing
individuals the right to own property, property rights under
Chinese Civil Law where divided into two kinds: Credit rights
and rights in rem. Credit rights are those that include
obligations owed to others arising from the existence of a
contract. 49 Rights in rem are the equivalent of ownership under
see also Commercial Leasing, supra note 43, at 88 (noting that current civil law in China
consists of several separate acts, and that among these, General Principles of Civil Law
is considered to be the core of civil law).
45 See RANDOLPH & JIANBO, supra note 22, at 31. This document totaled around 200
pages, hence the moniker.
46 See RANDOLPH & JIANBO, supra note 22, at 32 (stating that "judicial interpretation
of the Civil Law is primarily interpretation of governmental policy as embodied in the
statutes"); see also Commercial Leasing, supra note 43, at 89 n. 11 (commenting that some
of the 200 Clauses are not only interpretations of the General Principles of Civil Law are
not only interpretations, but additions to the law itself).
47 See RANDOLPH & JIANBO, supra note 22, at 32 (stating that the decisions of lower
courts have no precedential significance and only Supreme People's Court is entitled to
issue binding judicial interpretations); see also Commercial Leasing, supra note 43, at 89
n.11 (noting that only Supreme People's Court is entitled to issue binding judicial
documents).
48 See RANDOLPH & JIANBO, supra note 22, at 32 (noting that these documents, which
would be referred to as "opinions" in the American legal system, are labeled "responses" in
the Chinese system); see also Mark C. Lewis, Contract Law in the People's Republic of
China-Rule or Tool: Can the PRC's Foreign Economic Contract Law Be Administered
According to the Rule of Law?, 30 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 495, at 514 (stating that
Supreme People's Court has administrative jurisdiction over lower courts, original
jurisdiction in designated cases, and appellate jurisdiction over higher and specialty
courts).
49 RANDOLPH & JIANBO, supra note 22, at 42 n.53. "Contract rights are identified as
credit rights under Section 84 and 85 of the General Principles of Civil Law." Other types
2008]
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civil law. 50 These rights in rem are the civil law equivalent of our
common law theory of ownership interests.51
The state will protect an individual's "in rem" rights from all
others in the world. 52 If the state interferes with the right, it
must properly compensate the owner, similar to our concept of
eminent domain.5 3 An in rem right is mortgageable and the
mortgage interest held on such a right is itself in turn another in
rem right.54
Prior to the new property law no person or entity could "own"
any property in the PRC. Article 71 of the Civil Code states that
the Chinese concepts of property ownership refer to: Possession
(zhanyou), use (shiyong), the right to benefit (shouyiquan), and
the right to dispose (chufen).55 This foreclosed actual ownership
of the property itself. These interests are only a part of the
bundle of rights of ownership found in our common law.56
of credit rights include unjust enrichment and debatably tort claims. See generally XIAN
FA art. 85-86 (1982) (P.R.C.), available at http://www.dffy.com/faguixiazai/msfl200603
/20060320173214-10.htm (last visited April 15, 2007).
50 RANDOLPH & JIANBO, supra note 22, at 43. While the Chinese civil law does not
refer to these as "rights in rem," Chinese scholars agree that that is what they
substantially are under the "Property Ownership and Other Property Rights Related to
Ownership" in Chapter 5 of the General Principles of Civil Law. XIAN FA art. 85-86 (1982)
(P.R.C.), available at http://www.dffy.com/faguixiazai/msf/200603/20060320173214-
10.htm (last visited April 15, 2007).
51 See RANDOLPH & JIANBO, supra note 22, at 43 (stating that "there is a rough
correspondence between the "in rem" concept and legal title, or ownership"); General
Principles, supra note 50, Art. 73-83.
52 See RANDOLPH & JIANBO, supra note 22, at 43 n.56. The applicable portions of the
General Principles of Civil Law numbered 73, 74, and 75 correspond to state owned
property, collectively owned property, and citizen's lawful property respectively and all
contain similar language: the property is either sacred (state property) or protected from
any "organization or individual" seizing, encroaching, destroying, dividing, retaining, etc.
Id.
53 See RANDOLPH & JIANBO, supra note 22, at 43 (citing the Urban Real Estate
Administration Law, Section 19, and the state can only appropriate land for reasons
grounded in "social public interest[s]"). Cf. Kelo v. City of New London, 545 U.S. 469, 477
(2005) (stating that "[iut is... clear that a State may transfer property from one private
party to another if future 'use by the public' is the purpose of the taking.").
54 See RANDOLPH & JIANBO, supra note 22, at 44 (quoting the 1995 Security Law);
XTAN FA art. 94-97 (1982) (P.R.C.), available at http://www.dffy.comlfaguixiazailmsf
/200603/20060320173214-10.htm (last visited April 15, 2007).
55 See Alsen, supra note 2, at 25 (stating that "property ownership is divided into four
constituent 'powers and functions' (quanneng): Possession (zhanyou), use (shiyong), the
right to benefit (shouyiquan), and disposition (chufen)'); see also XIAN FA art. 71 (1982)
(P.R.C.), available at http://www.dffy.com/faguixiazai/msfI200603/20060320173214
10.htm (last visited April 15, 2007).
56 See Moore v. Regents of Univ. of Cal., 793 P.3d. 479 (Cal. 1990) (Mosk, J.,
dissenting) ("Ownership is not a single concrete entity but a bundle of rights and
privileges as well as of obligations.") (quoting Union Oil Co. v. State Bd. of Equal (Cal.
1963)).
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Chinese legal theorists and scholars experimented with different
combinations of these four allowable ownership interests and
came up with some interesting mixtures. 57
It was possible for an individual or corporation to own an
interest in property, and also to obtain various de jure ownership
rights in certain types of property.58 These de jure property
rights evolved as a social construct in a way that allowed China
to function as a market economy without the concrete property
rights that most economic and legal scholars deem a requisite to
prosperous economic growth. 59 In reviewing the path that China
has taken, we can see how different methods that look from all
practical purposes like ownership have arisen. Various
innovations such as long term interests, land use rights, and the
collectives that have sprung up all over China give the most
interesting insight as to how a society can start to move away
from a completely socialist state while not granting solid
property interests. 60
B. Historical Background
The Communist regime took power in China in 1949.61 They
57 See Alsen, supra note 2, at 25 (stating that Chinese legal theorists broke down
ownership into four constituent parts so they could build new rights with novel
combinations of the old parts); see also XIAN FA art. 71 (1982) (P.R.C.), available at
http://www.dffy.com/faguixiazai/msf/200603/20060320173214-10.htm (last visited April
15, 2007).
58 See Alsen, supra note 2, at 35 (explaining how individuals may "lawfully" own their
own income and savings, and how enacting various economic reforms is allowing for more
diverse forms of ownership); see also XIAN FA art. 71 (1982) (P.R.C.), available at
http://www.dffy.com/faguixiazai/msf/200603/20060320173214-10.htm (last visited April
15, 2007).
59 See Alsen, supra note 2, at 20-21 (surveying China's development from a centrally-
planned, state-run economy, which the Deng government realized was hampering
economic prosperity, to the development of private ownership and property rights within
the socialist construct).
60 See, e.g., Pittman B. Potter, Legal Reform in China: Institutions, Culture, and
Selective Adaptation, 29 LAW & SOC. INQUIRY 465, 471 (2004) ("Observers of China's
evolving property law regime, for example, have pointed out the enduring mystery of how
China has managed to achieve impressive rates of economic growth over more than two
decades without an institutionalized system of property rights.").
61 See Robin Munro, Judicial Psychiatry in China and its Political Abuses, 14 COLUM.
J. ASIAN L. 1, 65 (2000) (highlighting that Communist Party assumed control in China in
1949); see also RANDOLPH & JIANBO, supra note 22, at 14 ("After a short transition period
following the setting up of the People's Republic of China in 1949, China established a
complete Socialist political and economic system on the mainland ... characterized by: (1)
public ownership of the means of production, (2) highly centralized economic management
and organization through plan, and (3) unified state control over income and expenditure
of enterprises and institutions.").
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disbanded private ownership, abolished free markets and set up
a centrally controlled economy. 62 The Communists believed that
this would lead to the proletariat peoples of the country to join in
and work towards the main goal: advancing the interests of the
nation as a whole. 63 To the Communist Party's disappointment
and dismay, the lack of accountability and incentives to operate
efficiently foiled their plans. 64 China became riddled with loss
and debt.65
China wanted to establish market transactions, and in 1998 it
amended both the Constitution and the Land Administration
Law in order to permit the transfer of 'land use rights' to private
individuals. 66 This marked "the beginning of the institution of
market systems" in China.67 In sticking to their socialist guns,
62 See RANDOLPH & JIANBO, supra note 22, at 9-10 (detailing communist takeover and
process of state property appropriation, property owned by war criminals, traitors,
bureaucratic capitalists and counterrevolutionaries was seized immediately, while state
takeover of property owned by national bourgeoisie was more gradual and forgiving,
sometimes paying former owner up to 20% of income collected for certain time period.
Total ban on private ownership finally came about with adoption of 1982 Constitution in
which state declared itself owner of all urban land); see also Christopher M. Vaughn,
Venture Capital in China: Developing a Regulatory Framework, 16 COLUM. J. ASIAN L.
227, 232 (2002) (discussing Communist Regime's economic changes in China after taking
power).
63 See Minxin Pei, A Smoke Screen: China Needs Better Leadership, Not Another
Morality Campaign, NEWSWEEK, International Edition, Mar. 20, 2006, available at
http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/11788163/site/newsweek/ (stating Communist "party hoped
that communist ideology would bind the masses to its will."); Zhu Suli, "Federalism" in
Contemporary China-A Reflection on the Allocation of Power between Central and Local
Government, 7 SING. J. INT'L & COMP. L. 1, 4-5 (2003) (explaining communist party's goal
has been unified state and this can be seen by its policy of coordinating country as whole
under planned economy).
64 See Opinion, Don't Disturb China's Pace of Reform, L.A. TIMES, June 3, 1990, at 2
(positing difficulty in becoming incentive based economy from centralized economy that
was riddled with corruption); see also Janiece Marshall, Current Developments in the
People's Republic of China: Has China Changed?, 1 TRANSNAT'L LAW. 505, 508 (1988)
(commenting that communist party "did not fulfill its dual promises of prosperity through
economic modernization and security from barbarian invasion" because society was
divided and the economy was stumbling).
65 See Ann P. Vandevelde, Realizing the Re-emergence of the Chinese Stock Market:
Fact or Fiction?, 30 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 579, 583-84 (1997) (highlighting that
Communists' tight control had "stifled the country's economic development"); see also
Marshall, supra note 65, at 508 (1988) (highlighting that in decades after communists
took power, China had "faltering economy").
66 Joyce Palomar, Contributions Legal Scholars Can Make to Development Economics:
Examples From China, 45 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1011, 1026 (2004) [hereinafter Palomar I];
See Patrick A. Randolph, Jr. & Lou Jianbo, Chinese Real Estate Mortgage Law, 8 PAC. RIM
L. & POL'Y J. 515, 516 n. 1 (1999) (citing Chinese Constitution which states "right to the
use of land may be transferred in accordance with the law").
67 Randolph & Jianbo, supra note 22, at 17 (positing that this was also end of cultural
revolution); see Chinese Real Estate Mortgage Law, supra note 67, at 516 n. 1
(highlighting that China amended its constitution to establish market transactions as
means of resource distribution).
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the full ownership of the land remained in the hands of the State
or an Agricultural Collective.68 These land use rights were
granted to individuals for long terms, generally thirty to seventy
years.69 These rights could be leased, sold, mortgaged, or
otherwise transferred to other individuals. 70 These land use
rights are analogous to the common law concept of a long term
ground lease. 71 The concept is a product of ancient Roman civil
law which allows "land ownership without the characteristic of
accession."72 An individual or entity, the grantee, is granted use
of the land and if they make improvements in accordance to the
granted use, the grantee becomes the owner of the building, but
not the land on which the building sits. 73
C. Current and Past Privatization
The process of retaining the socialist state while creating a
separate concurrent market economy is probably the most
interesting feature of Chinese privatization and has been deemed
68 See Palomar I, supra note 66, at 1026 (discussing that State or agricultural
collective has full ownership of land); see also Bin Xue Sang, Pudong: Another Special
Economic Zone in China?-An Analysis of the Special Regulations and Policy for
Shanghai's Pudong New Area, 14 NW. J. INT'L L. & BUS. 130, 143 (1993) (noting State and
agricultural collectives have exclusive ownership of land in China and right to use land is
different from ownership).
69 See Palomar I, supra note 66, at 1026, which comments that although state has full
ownership of land, it may grant land use rights to private person for specific terms; see
also Phan I, supra note 5, at 614-15, which describes these different interests. In the rural
areas of China, land may be used for either farming or residential purposes and are
limited to a term of thirty years. Id. In the urban areas of China, the government agency
(the State Land Administration Bureau SLAB) can grant land use rights for no
compensation that carry no time limits, but can be taken back by the State as it wishes.
Land use rights in urban areas can also be granted as a type of leasehold interest for
which the state must be compensated, but the State promises not to take back the land
for a term of 70 years, unless "under special circumstances and in light of social and
public interests." Id. After the 70 year term is up the land reverts back to the state. Id.
70 See Palomar I, supra note 66, at 1026 (explaining ways land use rights can be
transferred); Chinese Real Estate Mortgage Law, supra note 67, at 516 n. 2 (1999) (noting
land use rights granted "may be transferred, leased, or mortgaged").
71 See RANDOLPH & JIANBO, supra note 22, at 18 (while many western lawyers and
business persons have considered this to be case, especially because most of land in Hong
Kong is subject to ground leases from government, most scholars in China trace roots of
land use right to Civil law, especially Germanic concept of erbbaurecht.); see generally
Rainer Frank, Privatization in Eastern Germany: A Comprehensive Study, 27 VAND. J.
TRANSNAT'L L. 809, 846 n. 267 (1994) (defining erbbaurecht as hereditary building right
which is an "encumbrance upon real estate consisting of a transferable and an inheritable
right to build or develop the land above or below the surface.").
72 RANDOLPH & JIANBO, supra note 22, at 18-19.
73 See id. at 19 (explaining that "[t]here are separate rights (rights in rem) in the
ground and in the building."); see also Commercial Leasing, supra note 43, at 98 (1996)
(discussing ability to have lease on building but no interest in ground).
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its "pluralization" process. 74 It is the creation of a non-state
sector separate of public ownership in addition to the retention of
the state sector. 75 Under the 1988 amendments to the Chinese
Constitution, the private sector is not merely supplementary to
the socialist public economy, but rather was created to exist as a
separate private economy. 76 The 1999 amendments to the
Constitution solidified the power of the individual, private and
non-state sectors of the socialist market economy.77 This was
done in "a series of 'trial and error' reforms." 78 As a result of
some of these reforms it is unclear as to what nature of property
interest the individuals and corporations in the non-state sector
hold, it would appear under a common law system that they
would hold mere leasehold estates. 79 This uncertainty was one of
the main reasons a property rights law was needed.
The Communist Party created the non-state sector because it
believed that successful state privatization could not take place
74 See Frank Xianfeng Huang, The Path to Clarity: Development of Property Rights in
China, 17 COLUM. J. AsIAN L. 191, 200-01 (2004) (stating "[o]n the one hand, while public
ownership forms are preserved, incidents of public ownership, specifically power to
possess, power to use, power of partial income and sometimes power to alienate, have
been gradually decentralized from the central government to local governments, from
government to business or non-business entities, and from entities to individuals. On the
other hand, a nascent private sector has been created through the introduction of foreign
investment and the recognition of 'individual industrial and commercial households' (geti
gongshang hu), individual partnerships (geren hehuo) and private enterprises (siying
qiye). The overwhelming majority of ambiguities of property rights exist within the
decentralized sectors."); see also Robert C. Art & Minkang Gu, China Incorporated: The
First Corporation Law of the People's Republic of China, 20 YALE J. INT'L L. 273, 282
(1995) (emphasizing China's commitment to socialism demonstrated through its
Corporation Law's "purpose of 'maintaining the social economic order and promoting the
development of a socialist market economy."').
75 See Lan Cao, The Cat that Catches Mice: China's Challenge to the Dominant
Privatization Model, 21 BROOK. J. INT'L L. 97, 102 (1995) [hereinafter Lan Cao I]
(discussing how China differs from dominant prescription for privatization by retaining
state sector while creating non-state sector); Darryll K. Jones, The Neglected Role of
International Altruistic Investment in the Chinese Transition Economy, 36 GEO. WASH.
INT'L L. REV. 71, 75 n.14 (2004) (clarifying Chinese privatization emphasizes retention of
state sector but creation of non-state sector to supplement state sector).
76 See Blanchard, supra note 38, at 384 (noting in 1988 China amended its
constitution to "formally endors[e] the existence and development of the private sector as
a supplement to the public economy."); RANDOLPH & JIANBO, supra note 22, at 60
(emphasizing 1988 amendments "declared for the first time that the State allows the
existence and development of a private economy within the limitation of law.").
77 See Blanchard, supra note 38, at 385 (describing that private sector was taken
"from it supplementary status to become a 'major component' of the socialist market
economy" in 1999); RANDOLPH & JIANBO, supra note 22, at 60 (explaining 1999
amendments increased official standing of private enterprise).
78 See Huang, supra note 74, at 201 (stating "decentralization process was a series of
'trial and error' reforms aimed at improving the efficiency of various public assets").
79 See id.
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without the existence of a non-state sector with market
characteristics and forces.8 0 In the non-state sector, the creation
of new firms, rather than the privatization of state sector firms
into the non-state sector, has been the driving force of China's
success. 8 1 The non-state sector has also been far more profitable
than the state sector.8 2 This has not been a hard feat for the
private sector to accomplish however, considering that the state
sector has been very unprofitable over the last decade or so. 83
It is interesting to note that China is not under any political
pressure to privatize, 84 at least not any internal pressure from
the masses, because the creation of the non-state sector has led
to such success and in turn such a high degree of wealth among
its citizens.8 5 Currently, Chinese citizens have one of the highest
80 See Lan Cao I, supra note 75, at 140 ("Private property without market forces may
simply create private owners who perpetuate the patterns of inefficient and monopolistic
behavior of their state predecessors."); see also Lan Cao, Public Perspectives on
Privatization: Chinese Privatization: Between Plan and Market, 63 LAW & CONTEMP.
PROB. 13, 22 (2000) [hereinafter Lan Cao II] ("Chinese reformers deferred state-sector
privatization and focused on establishing the fundamentals of a market-oriented
economy-in other words, a working market-in the newly created non-state sector.").
81 See Lan Cao I, supra note 75, at 130 (describing China's skepticism of the
privatization of the state sector and its success in creating non-state firms that have been
responsible for its record growth).
82 See Lan Cao I, supra note 75, at131-32 (discussing growth of non-state sector in
China and how new institutional structure has generated surplus capital); see also
Pamela L. Polevoy, Note, Privatization in Vietnam: The Next Step in Vietnam's Economic
Transition From a Nonmarket to a Market Economy, 23 BROOK J. INT'L L. 887, 894 (1998)
(noting the emergence of process of gradual privatization of state firms which focuses on
combating the problems of general inefficiency, low productivity and lack of profitability
plaguing state firms).
83 See Lan Cao I, supra note 75, at 116 ("State firms were seen as vestiges from the
past and were associated with inefficiency and unprofitability."); see also Polevoy, supra
note 82, at 896 (discussing transformation of PRC's economy and primary purpose of
economic reform as being the need to mobilize China's vast resources).
84 See Bersani, supra note 7, at 304 ("China ... is not making a head-long dash away
from communism; despite the 1989 student uprising in Tiananmen Square, the
government is currently under no apparent pressure from the masses to undergo radical
political change.").
85 See Fareed Zakaria, Does the Future Belong to China?, NEWSWEEK, May 9, 2005,
available at http://www.fareedzakaria.com/articles/newsweek/050905.html ("The results
have been astonishing. China has grown around 9 percent a year for more than 25 years,
the fastest growth rate for a major economy in recorded history. In that same period it has
moved 300 million people out of poverty and quadrupled the average Chinese person's
income. And all this has happened, so far, without catastrophic social upheavals. The
Chinese leadership has to be given credit for this historic achievement."); see also Bersani,
supra note 7, at 304 ("China's principal motivation for privatization is to address a very
different problem: Its private citizens are, in the PRC government's view, collectively too
rich. Private citizens in China harbor huge amounts of money in personal savings. As of
the end of 1992, the private savings of PRC citizens totaled U.S. $ 310 billion."); Lan Cao
II, supra note 80, at 43 ("Over the years, the prosperity of the non-state sector allowed
China's private citizens to save large amounts of money. With one of the highest annual
savings rates in the world-approximately thirty percent-private surplus capital at one
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savings rate in the world.8 6 China believes that this wealth
would do a great deal more good if funneled into productive
enterprises, especially if reinvested into the privatization of the
economy instead of stashed under worker's mattresses.8 7 The
Communist Party also views, in a slightly paranoid manner,
masses controlling such a large sum of capital as a potential
threat to political stability.88
D. Agricultural Collectives and Town and Village Enterprises
After the Chinese Constitution was amended in 1982, it
declared all land in China to be owned by either the State or by
an Agricultural Collective.8 9 The land in cities was designated
State land while the land in rural areas was mostly deemed that
of an Agricultural Collective. 90 The State is still the final
authority however, and can make decisions as to what land will
remain in the hands of the Collectives and what land they will
point constituted approximately 1.3 trillion yuan or $ 260 billion, although other sources
put the amount at $ 310 billion, with an estimated $ 200 billion idle in the domestic
banking system and another $ 100 billion concealed outside the system, under mattresses,
for example, by people distrustful of banks.").
86 See Lan Cao II, supra note 80, at 43-44 (noting how China's high savings rate
coupled with bank interest rates that are low makes investing in securities an appealing
option); see also Polevoy, supra note 82, at 896-97 (explaining how accumulation of private
wealth in China has become a political threat making the investment in state enterprises
a suitable mechanism for maintaining stability).
87 See Lan Cao II, supra note 80, at 44-45. However the author notes that "[1]ike its
other market-oriented measures, China's conversion of private savings into investment
capital must be contained within the perimeters of market socialism. Thus, capital
extracted from Chinese personal savings was converted initially into debt instruments
that do not threaten socialist ownership and later into limited minority interests that do
not threaten the state's role as majority shareholder of state enterprises, resulting in the
wrong sort of regulation: political regulation to serve the state's desire to maintain
control, rather than the necessary market regulation to transform state actors into
market actors." Id.
88 See William I. Friedman, One Country, Two Systems: The Inherent Conflict
Between China's Communist Politics and Capitalistic Securities Market, 27 BROOKLYN J.
INT'L L. 477, 478 (2002) ("The government viewed the disparity in wealth between the
state-owned sector and the private sector as politically threatening."); see also Wiktor
Osiatynski, Revolutions in Eastern Europe, 58 U. CHI. L. REV. 823, 848-49 (1991) (noting
how communist elites in Eastern Europe were against economic reforms that would cause
the them to lose power).
89 XIAN FA art. 10 (1982) (P.R.C.), available at http://english.people.com.cn
/constitutionlconstitution.html (stating "rural" and "suburban" lands are owned by
Agricultural Collectives); see RANDOLPH & JIANBO, supra note 22, at 59 (detailing system
of Agricultural Collectives in China).
90 XIAN FA art. 10 (1982) (P.R.C.), available at http://english.people.com.cn
/constitution/constitution.html (noting some land is owned by state "in accordance with
the law"); see RANDOLPH & JIANBO, supra note 22, at 59 (detailing the system of
Agricultural Collectives in China).
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requisition for non agricultural public uses.91 These Collectives
are the modern day equivalent of communes prevalent in the
1960s throughout China.92 The workers who farm the land are
the owners of the Collectives.93 Collectives can be formed for
many different purposes, but the Agricultural Collectives are the
most popular and the only entities that can own land.94 The
types of Agricultural Collective land can be classified in one of
three ways: (1) land owned by Township Agricultural
Collectives, 95 (2) land owned by village Agricultural Collectives, 96
and (3) land owned by an Agricultural Collective that does not
consist of an entire village. 97 As a part of the pluralization
process, and the fact that each locality operates separately and
independently from the central government, these Agricultural
Collectives became part of the private market economy. 98
The primary objective of agricultural collectives is to cultivate
91 XIAN FA art. 10 (1982) (P.R.C.), available at http://english.people.com.cn
/constitutionlconstitution.html; see RANDOLPH & JIANBO, supra note 22, at 59 n.1 ("[T]he
State ... can requisition land from Agricultural Collectives when [it] determines that...
it needs the land for public non-agricultural purposes.").
92 See RANDOLPH & JIANBO, supra note 22, at 74 ("The concept of a Collective is a
holdover from historical attempts at organization of the Chinese Society"); see also Huang,
supra note 74, at 213 n.126 (characterizing the collective ownership of rural lands as
"people's commune[s]").
93 See RANDOLPH & JIANBO, supra note 22, at 74 ("Collectives are 'owned' by certain
of their workers, but Collectives may have employees who are not owners."); Huang,
supra note 74, at 214 (stating "rural lands are collectively owned by members of a village
and managed by the village committee").
94 See RANDOLPH & JIANBO, supra note 22, at 74-75, 81 (explaining how other
collectives can be formed for industrial or public service purposes and while these
collectives will not own the land they operate on, they can possess land use rights, and
also discussing how Agricultural Collectives cannot change the use purpose of their arable
land unless they get approval from the local people's government at the county level).
95 See RANDOLPH & JIANBO, supra note 22, at 76. Land owned in this manner is
operated by the township (same as a town) government, or in some areas the land is
operated and/or managed by township agricultural-industrial-commercial complexes,
which were designed to manage business affairs to separate from government functions.
Id. at 76 n.58.
96 See id. at 76-78. Villages came to own the land and were operated and managed by
village Agricultural Production Cooperatives or village committees. These entities were
also created to separate the business affairs of the Collective from the functions of the
government, in the case of the village committees, they were created by the residents, and
the members of the committee are elected by the people. Id. at 77 nn. 59-60.
97 See id. at 77. This land usually consists of subdivisions of larger villages.
Sometimes it was to difficult to account properly for separate teams that worked on a
large village collective, so it was broken up for convenience. Id. at 77 n. 62.
98 RANDOLPH & JIANBO, supra note 22, at 60 (detailing how "[t]he 1988 amendments
to the Constitution, however, declared for the first time that the State allows the
existence and development of a private economy within the limitation of the law.");
Huang, supra note 74, at 200-01 (discussing ambiguity that has arisen with regard to
public and private sector property rights as a function of the pluralization process).
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the land. 99 However, because agricultural reform led to surplus
labor, many peasant workers had to find non-agricultural
employment.' 00 This mass of labor capital was utilized by
collective industries operating in the light industrial and also
heavy industrial, service, construction, and transportation
sectors of the economy. 101 These entities have become known as
Township and Village Enterprises.102
Township and Village Enterprises ("TVEs") are an interesting
way that China's economy has developed. These entities
developed for a variety of reasons.1 03 Although TVEs are not
privately owned, they operate entirely separate from the state
sector, are collectively owned, and can be said to be an arm of
local governments.104 They are sometimes considered local
governments exercising ownership rights and acting in an
entrepreneurial manner. 105
99 See Alsen, supra note 2, at 33 (noting that Collectives own the land and often
contract it out); see also Feng Chen, The New Era of Chinese Contract Law: History,
Development and a Comparative Analysis, 27 BROOK. J. INT'L L. 153, 156 (2001)
(describing rural land collectives as "agricultural collective organization[s]" whose
purpose is to grow crops for profit).
100 See Alsen, supra note 2, at 33 ("Since the agricultural reform has produced
surplus labor, many peasants have been freed to pursue other occupations."); see generally
Lihu Chen & Yun Gu, China's Safeguard Measures Under the New WTO Framework, 25
FORDHAM INT'L L. J. 1169, 1186 n.11 (2002) (noting that the purpose of collective
enterprises was to "promote economic growth, absorb the surplus rural labor force, and
discourage excessive urban migration" and that there was a surplus of over 92 million
rural workers).
101 Alsen, supra note 2, at 33 ("These rural industries, known as township and village
enterprises (TVE) are active primarily in light industry but are also found in heavy
industry as well as in the service, construction and transport sectors."); see Chen & Gu,
supra note 100, at 1186 n.11 ("Township enterprises cover manufacturing, construction,
mining, transport and communications, commerce, service and other businesses.").
102 See Alsen, supra note 2, at 33 (noting that these rural collective industries are
"known as township and village enterprises (TVE)"); Lan Cao I, supra note 81, at 103
(defining collective enterprises as township village enterprises (TVEs)).
103 See Lan Cao I, supra note 75, at 136-37 ("TVEs came into being through a
combination of factors: the success of agricultural reforms, the availability of surplus
rural labor, savings from increased agricultural income, and increased consumer goods
consumption due to the rise in income."); Brett H. McDonnell, Lessons From the Rise and
(Possible) Fall of Chinese Township-Village Enterprises, 45 WM. & MARY L. REV. 953, 965
(2004) (describing a combination of factors that gave strong incentives to develop TVEs:
opening of product markets, success of agricultural reform, increased labor-savings, and
greater efficiency in farming that left more people available for other work (surplus rural
labor force)).
104 See Lan Cao I, supra note 75, at 137 (stating that TVEs "are not privately owned
enterprises in the traditional sense, they do operate outside the orbit of the state sector"
but that they are often "intricately intertwined with local governments."); see also Lan
Cao II, supra note 80, at 31 ("Although TVEs are not private enterprises because they are
deemed to be 'collectively owned,' they nonetheless operate in a market environment
outside the state plan.").
105 See Lan Cao I, supra note 75, at 138 ('rVEs, in fact, appear to be decentralized
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Regardless of how they are controlled, TVEs have an
unprecedented track record of growth, perplexing many legal and
economic writers. 106 They have been called "private firms in
disguise."z07 They are highly competitive with one another
because the markets they serve are not protected, as are some
state enterprises. 0 8 They compete in both the domestic and
international export markets.109
The interesting way that TVEs have developed, and the fact
that they do not fit into any state, corporate, or any other form
recognized by the government, leaves them in a very precarious
position as far as legal ownership rights are concerned. 110 Almost
no laws exist to protect TVEs.111 Local governments can take
their property right out from under them and, additionally,
random fines and assessments are regularly imposed on them
without warning.Z12  The persons involved in these TVEs
local states acting in an entrepreneurial capacity."); Alsen, supra note 2, at 34 (noting
that in many cases owners of TVEs are units of local government on different levels).
106 See Lan Cao I, supra note 75, at 139 (discussing TVEs "uncontested record of
economic growth" and that economists are trying to "make sense of this seemingly
perplexing phenomenon"); Huang, supra note 75, at 196 (noting China's fast-growing
township and village enterprises and the several theories scholars have on their economic
growth); Lan Cao II, supra note 80, at 31 ("Among the emerging firms in the new, non-
state sector, TVEs have demonstrated one of the most remarkable growth and output
rates.").
107 Lan Cao I, supra note 75, at 139 (discussing economists characterization of TVEs
as "privately-owned firms in disguise."); see Alsen, supra note 2, at 34 ("In many
provinces, the 'collective industry' is simply a cover for private companies, that, for
different reasons, prefer to be labeled as TVEs.").
108 See Alsen, supra note 2, at 34 (stating that TVEs compete with one another and
unlike other enterprises, the local governments normally refuse to aid the TVEs); see also
Lan Cao II, supra note 80, at 31 (noting that TVEs "operate in a market environment
outside of the state plan, are not subsidized by the state, and are subjected to hard budget
constraints").
109 See Alsen, supra note 2, at 34 ("The TVEs compete with each other both in the
domestic and the export market."); see also Lan Cao I, supra note 75, at 136 ("With the
growth of TVEs, production of consumer goods for both the export and domestic market
developed, and indeed prospered at an unprecedented rate.").
110 See Alsen, supra note 2, at 34 (noting that "[t]he company forms available in
China today do not fit the very special collective enterprises" and as a result, "millions of
small rural companies do not fit into any company form found in Chinese law); Lan Cao I,
supra note 75, at 138 ("TVEs are neither private nor state enterprises and cannot easily
fit into the traditional and binary classification of state planning or free market.").
111 See Alsen, supra note 2, at 34 ("Since these types of enterprises have developed
spontaneously, almost no laws exist to regulate TVEs."); Lan Cao I, supra note 75, at 139
("TVEs simply do not fit within the established rules which a traditional property rights
regime is supposed to entail.").
112 See Alsen, supra note 2, at 34 ('The unsure status of TVEs have left them
vulnerable to intervention from local bureaucrats. In some areas, local governments
change the ownership of the TVE or simply take away property from the companies.
Furthermore, random levies and fines are frequently imposed upon the companies."); see
also Lan Cao I, supra note 75, at 139 ("Because TVEs are collectives, the local community
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desperately need the protection of the property rights law in
order to protect their interests.
III. PROBLEMS IN THE PRC PROPERTY SYSTEM IN NEED OF
RESOLUTION
China amended its constitution and land administration law in
1988 to allow the transfer of "land use rights" to private
parties.113  China also enacted regulations to allow the
conveyance of long term land use rights in order for development
by businesses, further, they enacted new land registration rules,
and set forth a new law for the administration of urban real
estate. 114 Although these rights could be transferred to private
entities, the right of ownership remained in the state or a
derivative of the state (an Agricultural Collective for example).115
The State Land Administration promulgated rules to provide for
a uniform system of registering interests in land.116 The transfer
of these rights has lead to many problems in the past due to, in
part: the lack of enforcement of the laws in place, the ambiguity
of the laws, problems in the land registration system, and the
government, not a private owner, exercise ownership rights.").
113 See Joyce Palomar, Land Tenure Security as a Market Stimulator in China, 12
DUKE J. COMP. & INT'L L. 7 at 16 (2002) [hereinafter Palomar II] ("In 1988, as part of the
government's goal of establishing market transactions, China amended its Constitution.");
see also Phan I, supra note 5, at 615-16 ("The National People's Congress ('NPC') amended
the Constitution in 1988 to read: 'the right to use land may be transferred according to
law.' Soon thereafter, it revised Article 2 of the Land Management Law ('LML') to read:
'the right to use State owned or collectively owned land may be assigned pursuant to the
law."').
114 See Palomar II, supra note 113, at 16 ("China enacted regulations allowing the
conveyance of long-term land use rights to businesses for the purpose of development.");
Commercial Leasing, supra note 43, at 91 (1996) (noting the enactment of special
legislation such as the Law on Urban Real Estate Administration and the Regulations on
the Granting and Transfer of Land Use Rights on State Owned Land for Valuable
Consideration in Cities and Towns).
115 See Palomar II, supra note 113, at 16 ('Though the State may transfer 'land use
rights' to private persons and entities, the right of ownership of the land remains vested
in either the State or an Agricultural Collective."); see also Harry Williams, Property
Rights and Legal Reform in Township and Village Enterprises in China, 2 AsIAN-PAC. L.
& POL'Y J. 8, 246 (2001) (explaining how under the Regulations, the township or village
ran the enterprise and ownership rights "did not change when the enterprise entered into
agreements such as a managerial contract responsibility system, leasing, or joint
operations with enterprises of other types of ownership").
116 See Palomar II, supra note 113, at 19 ("[T]he State Land Administration
promulgated rules to provide for a uniform system of registering interests in land.");
Commercial Leasing, supra note 43, at 93 (noting that the State Land Administration
established a registry system).
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political corruption so prevalent in China. 117
A. Problems with the Land Registry and Conveyance of Land Use
Rights
The registry of rights is used in many countries to establish
conclusively the rights to each piece of land, as opposed to the
American system of recording which serves merely to give notice.
A right is not recognized until it is entered in the registry, even if
legitimate.118 The maintenance of such a registry can be very
expensive and more than a local government can bear. This in
turn can cause many more problems in local governments in
China. Although it is a long way from being able to rely on its
accuracy, China has adopted this system of land registry.
The registration of ownership interests is not a right but a duty
in China, and failure to do so can lead to a hefty fine.ll 9 It acts as
more than just a notice system; it is actually the formal creation
of the interest in the property.120 The registration takes
preference over any contractual obligations.121 Therefore, if a
seller contracts with buyer 1 to sell a parcel and then sells the
same parcel to buyer 2 who registers first, buyer 2 will be the
proper owner (this is true for real property-movable property
may be transferred by the delivery of such item).122 This is
117 See Palomar II, supra note 113, at 18-19 (discussing the problems and risks that
have arisen in China's current real estate laws and title registration system, and noting
that they are due in part to a lack of enforcement of current law and the ambiguity of the
laws).
118 See Palomar II, supra note 113, at 56 ("With a few exceptions, rights not reflected
in the register are not to be recognized, even if legitimate."); see also Commercial Leasing,
supra note 43, at 93 (noting that registration in China is more than a notice system; it is
the formal creation of the interest).
119 See RANDOLPH & JIANBO, supra note 22, at 159 ("Registration of ownership is not
a right or a privilege in China; it is a duty. Failure to register ownership of a land use
right or building can result in a fine."); see also Commercial Leasing, supra note 43, at 93
(stating that registration in China as more than notice system but the formal creation of
the interest).
120 See RANDOLPH & JIANBO, supra note 22, at 159. Section 3 of the 1998
Implementing Regulations of the Land Administration Law states, "[l]egally registered
land ownership and land use [nlights [sic] shall be protected by law and free from
infringement." Id. at 159 n.2. Although he is talking about security interests, Todd
Benson describes how failure to register can invalidate an entire transaction. Todd
Benson, Taking Security in China: Approaching U.S. Practices?, 21 YALE J. INT'L L. 183,
199 (1996).
121 See RANDOLPH & JIANBO, supra note 22, at 159-60 (stating that "the registration
requirement is absolute" and explaining how it can even supersede contractual
obligations).
122 See id. Article 72 of the General Principles of Civil Law states that "the ownership
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similar to the "first in time, first in right" concept in American
law.123 Such a system would work, if it were accurate. There was
debate prior to the enactment of the 1994 Administration Act as
to whether the state should provide additional protection to
property interests obtained by entities besides only upholding the
registration, however this was not incorporated into the Act. 124
As it currently stands the registration system in the PRC
requires that four main types of ownership interests be
registered: "Agricultural Collective land ownership, land use
rights on State-owned land," land use rights on "Agricultural
Collective-owned land, and building ownership."125  Other
interests in property that must be registered are "mortgages,
leaseholds on land use rights, presale contracts, and various
others."126
In the PRC at the moment up to seven different registries
exist.127 One of the main problems relates to the existence of
separate registries for buildings and the land under and around
the same building.128  The requirement for two separate
of property obtained by contract or by other lawful means shall be transferred
simultaneously with the property itself." Id. at 160 n.4. But for the transfer of real estate
interests, delivery is not enough. The parties must go through the registration process. Id.
123 See Sauget v. Villagomez, 228 F.2d 374, 376 (9th Cir. 1955) (affirming lower
court's determination that appellee was "first in time and first in right" and therefore
could not be ejected by appellant); Bailey Mortgage Co. v. Gobble-Fite Lumber Co., 565
So. 2d 138, 143 (Ala. 1990) (stating "Alabama is a 'title theory' state, meaning that [they]
adopt the general rule represented by the maxim 'prior in tempore, potior in jure' (first in
time, superior in right)" and further explaining that "[tihe order of priority between
persons claiming an interest in the same property ... is fixed by the order in which they
are filed for record.").
124 See RANDOLPH & JIANBO, supra note 22, at 160 (providing both sides of the debate
and pointing out that it was never resolved because 1994 Administration Act is silent on
this issue).
125 Id. at 161 (explaining the current real estate registration system).
126 Id.
127 Id.
128 See Palomar I, supra note 67, at 1039-40 (2004).
"[L]egal scholars identified conflicts within the property rights institution itself
involving China's dual land registry system-one system and location for land use
rights registration and a separate system and location for building ownership and
lease registration. A title risk exists if an owner registers ownership of a building,
but fails to register simultaneously an ownership interest in the land use right to
the land under and around the building. Legal scholars recommended that for
efficiency, consistency, and accuracy in both registration of transfers and
examination of title, these systems should be consolidated. The 1994 Law on Urban
Real Estate Administration authorized provincial governments to consolidate the
registration systems within their own jurisdictions. As a result, regulations were
passed in Shanghai and Shenzhen to provide for one government agency, the
Municipal Building and Land Bureau, to issue a uniform certificate for both
interests. In 2003, Chinese legal scholars began drafting a set of registration
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registries, one for buildings, and the other for the land under the
buildings, came about as a result of the 1994 Law on Urban Real
Estate Administration (Chapter 5).129 While local governments
are required to issue certificates for both buildings and the land
underneath as well, only some localities, mostly large cities, have
begun to do so.1 30 Most smaller local governments have not
begun to do so.
In order to register an interest in property certain steps must
be complied with for all interests, with minor caveats depending
on the type of interest being registered. Whenever an interest in
property is affected, whether through creation, alteration or
destruction, the owner of the interest must apply within a time
period of 30 days from the incident.131 The registry office checks
the application, issues a receipt, then will examine the
application in detail.132 If all is in order the registry office will
then issue a certificate of land use right or building ownership.133
The registries in urban areas can generally be relied upon,
however the registries outside of these areas remain suspect due
to "concerns about the accuracy, the completeness, or even the
existence of registries outside of the larger city areas."134 Access
to registries should be allowed free to the public at all locations,
but it remains to be seen whether this will be the case. It is not
reasonable for an investor to purchase an interest in property
from a seller when they cannot be certain the seller is actually
the individual recorded in the registry. Additionally, the high fee
for access to registry records has inhibited the use of the registry
in some locales.135 The risks inherent in planning, financing, and
regulations for Beijing that would accomplish the same. Legal scholars have
recommended that further consolidation of the two registry systems throughout the
country can reduce inconsistencies, confusion, time and expense in both
registration and examination of rights to land and buildings."
Id. See also Benson, supra note 120, at 199 n.93 (1996) (citing David Dall Liu & Mark
Reed, Taking and Enforcing Security in the People's Republic of China 5 (Jan. 1, 1994)
(unpublished manuscript, on file with author)) (discussing how buildings and fixtures are
normally mortgaged together with underlying land use rights, but each must be
registered with different authorities).
129 See RANDOLPH & JIANBO, supra note 22, at 163.
130 See id. at 163 (explaining how Shanghai and Shenzhen now issue uniform
certificates for both interests).
131 See id. at 164.
132 See id.
133 See id. at 164-65.
134 See id. at 165.
135 See Palomar I, supra note 66, at 1038 (explaining how the fees charged coupled
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developing new locations can just be too high in consideration of
the fact that the developer cannot find the parcel in the
registry. 136
B. Government Seizure of Land, Political Corruption and
Treatment of the Poor
The argument has been made that one of the major stimulants
in China's furious rate of economic growth has been the rigid
dichotomy between the secure property rights granted to
investors and the paltry protections for individual's land property
rights.i 37 As local governments operate as separate fiscal
entities, they compete with one another to offer protection to
investors looking to acquire property for development.138 In this
respect these local governments have an incentive to take private
individuals' land and give it to large investors or corporations.
This has lead to major social unrest due to the lack of protections
for Chinese citizens.1 39 It is imperative that the Chinese
government weigh the benefit of giving land to investors against
the detriment of taking the homes of its citizen work force.
China has not been evenhanded in using its power to seize
property for "public use."140 It has also been complacent about
the corruption prevalent in the government when it comes to
getting major investment deals done.14i This may pose a serious
with the risk involved has slowed use of registry).
136 Id. In addition to the new property rights law, "[tlo reduce that risk, China's
Ministry of Land and Resources adopted a new law, effective March 2003, declaring that
registries must be open for public inquiry. Chapter Two of the new Property Code
proposed by Chinese legal scholars would mandate further that registries must be open
for inspection, registration fees must be 'moderate,' and all matters must be registered in
a timely manner." Id. at 1038-39.
137 See XIAOBO ZHANG, ASYMMETRIC PROPERTY RIGHTS IN CHINA'S ECONOMIC
GROWTH 1 (2006), http://aeaweb.org/annual-mtg-papers/2006/0108-1300_O204.pdf.
138 See id. ("[I]n the presence of mobile foreign direct investments and under the
arrangement of fiscal decentralization, local governments compete vigorously to offer
various protections on the property rights of investors").
139 Li Shuguang, a dean at the China University of Politics and Law, stated that the
rise in social instability indicated that the dominant issue for common people was no
longer "poverty of material resources" but "poverty of rights and power." See Kahn, supra
note 3, at A14. He implies that the leaders should address those concerns with political
rather than economic measures. Id.
140 See Maureen Fan, China Looks to Protect Private Property, WASH. POST, Mar. 9,
2007, at A16. Liu Xiaobo, a leading political activist, states "since land is in the hand of
the government, a developer can bribe an official and make the official claim that the land
is seized for public use." Id. Local Chinese governments have also engaged in relocation
and demolition under the guise of "public project." Liu, supra note 2, at 8.
141 See Joseph Kahn, Chinese Corruption Inquiry Expands to Beijing Party Leaders,
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threat to China's long term growth prospects.
The first transfers of land use rights in China occurred in the
Shenzhen Special Economic Zone.142 This proved to be hugely
successful. After the government saw the potential positive
effect this could have on the nation the Congress passed
legislation allowing "economic and technological zones" (ETDZs)
to be created, these were a mechanism through which the
government could have more flexibility in the granting of land
use rights.143 The number of these ETDZ zones exploded all over
the map of the PRC at an alarming rate, most notably near the
coast. 144 These ETDZs provided such an influx of capital, and
local politicians were so eager to get the new investment, that
numerous local governments even created some ETDZs without
prior authorization. 145
Land management in the PRC has become decentralized as a
result of local governments operating, in essence, independently
from the central government.146 This decentralization of land use
control led to the State sector's need for private investment to fill
the economic gap left behind.147 This has lead to a breeding
ground of competition between localities in the PRC, each
N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 26, 2006 (reporting on a wide anti-corruption inquiry targeting Beijing's
party leaders and examining corrupt property deals and procurement practices); see also
Liu, supra note 2, at 14 (stating bribes from land sale deals account for a major source of
corruption, which is a widespread problem in China).
142 See Alsen, supra note 2, at 2 (pointing out that the new Special Economic Zone
was a system where rental of state land was first attempted); see also Phan I, supra note
5, at 616 (stating that the first land transfers had taken place in 1987 in the Shenzhen
Special Economic Zone).
143 See Phan I, supra note 5, at 616 (citing Mark T. Kremzner, Managing Urban
Land in China: The Emerging Legal Framework and its Role in Development, 7 PAC. RIM
L. & POL'Y J. 611, 638 (1998)) (stating that the greater flexibility includes: the duration of
grant terms, the streamlined procedures and conditions necessary for assignment of
property interests, and also in some areas reduced grant fees).
144 See id. (stating that ETDZs proliferated in the coastal provinces).
145 See id. (stating that local government chose to forgo authorization in setting up
ETDZs in order to attract foreign investors); see also ChinaDaily.com, 3, 763 Economic
Development Zones Canceled, CHINA DAILY, Apr. 10, 2004 (reporting that China has
quashed 3,763 economic zones in 2003 alone).
146 See id. (citing Tingwei Zhang, Decentralization, Localization, and the Emergence
of Quasi-Participatory Decision-Making Structure in Urban Development in Shanghai, 7
INT'L PLAN. STUD. 303, 305 (2002)) (stating effect of this was to "modernize" by
decentralizing land management).
147 See id. (stating that the public sector found it necessary to turn to non-public
sectors in order to secure economic development); see also Howard W. French, New
Boomtowns Change Path of China's Growth, N.Y. TIMES, July 28, 2004, at Al (pointing
out that provinces raise money for their own projects by selling rights to develop real
estate).
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competing with the other to attract private investment.148
Whether a local government official is doing his job correctly or
not is determined by the increase in the economic numbers of
their locality.149 Local government leaders are driven to attract
investment to their own areas to grow the economic clout of their
locality, which in turn leads to greater prestige and political
power for themselves. 150
As the current power structure exists with local leaders
thirsting for investment, residential communities have had to
bear the negative aspects of rapid economic growth: huge
displacements of residential communities has become
commonplace with an even larger number planned to be
displaced in the future.151 Paradoxically, the local planning
officials state that the displacement of these residential
communities is for the greater good, in that it will lead to an
overall increase in the citizens of the PRC's quality of life. 152
Many PRC residents and scholars have seen through this fagade
and accused the government of ordering the land takings for the
sole motive of profit. 153
Indeed, many local governments have negotiated with real
148 See Phan I, supra note 5, at 617 (stating that the cities and individual districts
engage in fierce competition over investment); see also French, supra note 147, at Al
(pointing out that cities are locked in competition over ambitious decentralized
development plans).
149 See Liu, supra note 2, at 8 (stating that local officials have put their emphasis on
generating economic growth in order to get reappointed or promoted); see also Phan I,
supra note 5, at 618 (pointing out that local official are judged by economic measures).
150 See Liu, supra note 2, at 8 (stating that the appointments of local officials to key
posts is decided by how well the local official implements orders from the top, which
results in local officials placing sole emphasis on economic growth); see also Phan I, supra
note 5, at 618 (pointing out that local officials have incentive to develop because of the
increase of political influence that comes with the increase of economic power).
151 See Phan I, supra note 5, at 618 (stating that Beijing has acknowledged that since
1991, 400,000 households have been relocated and officials expect to relocate another
6000 in anticipation of the construction of Olympics venues designed to hold the 2008
games); see also Shanghai Residents Make Room for World Expo, CHINA DAILY, Nov. 9,
2004, available at http://www.china.org.cn/english/2004/Nov/111609.htm (last visited Apr.
6, 2007) (reporting that Shanghai plans to move estimated 50,000 people in the largest
relocation project in Shanghai history to make room for development).
152 See Ma Lie, Xi'an Plans to Better Protect Ancient Walled Centre, CHINA DAILY,
Nov. 3, 2004, available at http://english.people.com.cn/200411/03/eng20041103
_162597.html (last visited April 6, 2007) (reporting that Chinese official Lin Lize stated
future development aims to make the city into international modern metropolis while
protecting the ancient district); see also Phan I, supra note 5, at 618 (stating that local
officials emphasize that living conditions will be greatly improved).
153 See Phan I, supra note 5, at 618 (citing China to Evict 170,000 Residents from
Ancient City of Xian, Agence France-Presse (Beijing), Nov. 3, 2004) (stating that residents
accused government officials to profit from the sale of land).
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estate developers and granted these developers "sweetheart"
deals, which can be viewed as loose partnerships.154 Because the
local governments have the same incentives to take the residents'
land as the developers do, when a collective or individual will not
deal with a real estate developer directly, the developer will
employ the local government to take the land for a "public
purpose."155 Officials exploit the lax nature of the property law
allowing a taking for public purpose without even considering
what the purpose is.156 The existing law lets them define both
what a public purpose is and also the amount of compensation
necessary to perform the taking.157 Therefore local governments
have their interests aligned not with the residents of the
community that they exist to serve, but rather with the profit
hungry non-state sector.158
The government's acquiescence, even promotion of developers'
goals, has led to many accounts of laws and regulations falling to
the wayside. Developers "overturn zoning and building codes
with skillful arguments and, quite often bribes, turning inner-
city redevelopment into a process of 'speculation, private deals
154 See Fan, supra note 141, at A16 (pointing out that provinces sell rights to develop
real estate); see also Phan I, supra note 5, at 619 (stating that the pairing of local
government with business interest groups creates coalitions that are threats to residents).
155 See Fan, supra note 141, at A16 (reporting a developer can bribe an official and
make the official claim that the land is seized for public use); see also Phan I, supra note
5, at 619 (stating that developers can always rely on government to achieve their aims).
156 See Wilhelm, supra note 13, at 227 (stating that local governments have virtually
unlimited discretion to approve redevelopment projects and delegate eminent domain-like
powers to redevelopers); see also French, supra note 147, at Al (reporting that the
unchecked development means there is little ability to actually consider needs, to prevent
duplication, or to prevent waste).
157 See Liu, supra note 2, at 2 (pointing out that "public purpose" takings have been
widely misused and commercial developers have been reluctant to provide residents with
compensation and relocation arrangements); see also Wilhelm supra note 13, at 229
(stating that the redevelopment does not need to satisfy any administrative or judicial
test for "public interest" in order for the government to exercise this eminent domain
power).
158 See Liu, supra note 2, at 25 (noting that "Chinese scholars pointed out that 'the
government has inappropriately become both a player and referee at the same time"')
(quoting Zhang Hui, Chaiqian Biancheng Raomin Gongcheng, Zhengfu Ying Zhuanxin
Danghao "Caipan Yuan" [Demolition Infringed Upon Private Property Rights; Government
Should Offer Protection], Beijing Wan Bao [Beijing Evening News], Apr. 2, 2004, available
at http://www.news.xinhuanet.com/newscenter/2004-04/02/contenLl398552.htm); see also
Wilhelm, supra note 13, at 234 ("Local governments package, price, and sell LURs [land
use rights] to benefit their own coffers, offering discounts to attract investors to their
cities. They have a direct financial interest in encouraging urban redevelopment. At the
same time, they are charged with protecting evictees during urban redevelopment by
ensuring that evictees are compensated and not subjected to illegal harassment.
Predictably, local governments have often shown more concern for developers than for
evictees.").
2008]
ST JOHN'S JOURNAL OFLEGAL COMMENTARY [Vol. 22:3
and corruption."'159 Critics have stated that the most valuable
business asset that can be had in China is guanxi, or "special
friends" in the government.160 The reality could be that the
permeating corruption has just become the norm of doing
business in China, or it could be that the norm of doing business
in modern day China just appears as a maze of corruption to us
outsiders.161
The due process requirement implicit in a taking performed by
the government in the U.S. does not exist in the PRC, residents
can receive notice mere days before their property is to be
taken.162 Additionally as there is no judicial review in the PRC, a
collective or individual farmer who objects to a taking cannot
obtain an injunction.163 It is possible, however, to litigate the
issue of the amount of compensation due to the collective or
individual whose land was taken.164 This serves as little relief,
considering that the courts are subsidiary to and actually agents
159 Phan I, supra note 5, at 622 (quoting Yan Zhang & Ke Fang, Is History Repeating
Itself? From Urban Renewal in the United States to Inner-City Redevelopment in China,
23 J. PLANNING EDUC. & RESEARCH 286, 291 (2004)).
160 See PATRICK A. RANDOLPH JR., THOUGHTS ON CHINESE REAL ESTATE LAW:
INTEGRATING PRIVATE PROPERTY INTO A SOCIALIST GOVERNMENTAL STRUCTURE, AALS
PROP. & ENVTL. L. CONF. 130 (2004), http://aalsweb.aals.org/midyear20O4/randolph.pdf;
see also Henry J. Graham, Foreign Investment Laws of China and the United States: A
Comparative Study, 5 J. TRANSNAT'L L. & POLY 253, 254 (1996) (stating personal
connections, called guanxi, are paramount and critical to business success).
161 See RANDOLPH, supra note 160, at 131 (suggesting "the perception [to be] a
problem for a people wishing to invite strangers to invest with them in their nation's
economic future"); see also Graham, supra note 160, at 269 (according to investment
banker Marc Faber, local governments have increasing power to allocate resources forcing
the small entrepreneur to buy off the local government leaders in order to set up a
business and to resolve this issue, either the central government has to step in to control
corruption or it must allow private companies to grow larger in order to be in a stronger
position to deal with local government).
162 See Sara Meg Davis & Lin Hai, Demolished: Forced Evictions and the Tenants'
Rights Movement in China, 16 HUM. RTS. WATCH No. 4 (C), 12-13 (2004); see also Phan I,
supra note 5, at 631 (stating that in urban areas local governments have to notify
residents of the existence of eviction plan, while in rural areas somewhat greater
protection exists and certain regulations exist that allow collectives and single farmers to
object to the government takings, or the amount of the compensation and request a
hearing within 10 days; however, this is merely seen as window dressing).
163 See Phan I, supra note 5, at 639 (finding "the ability to seize and demolish the
property [to] not become a point of contention ... because demolition may proceed even
before lawsuits have been decided"); see also Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo Tudi Guanlifa
Shishi Tiaoli [PRC Implementing Regulations] (issued by the State Council on Dec. 24,
1998, effective Jan. 1, 1999, superceding Jan. 4, 1991, version) art. 16, (Apr.4, 2007),
available at http://www.lawllO.com/law/ guowuyuan2011.htm. [hereinafter PRC
Implementing Regulations].
164 See Phan I, supra note 5, at 639 ("Actual control over the property is effectively
conceded to the government, and the 'fight' by default focuses heavily on determination of
the compensation terms, ex post facto."); PRC Implementing Regulations, supra note 163.
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of the government that is taking the land in the first place.165
The interesting phenomenon with all this displacement is that
it feeds a vicious cycle of poverty. 166 With the red hot real estate
market and the rising prices of housing in China, the poor who
have their property taken are inadequately compensated and
therefore cannot afford to live in the areas they once did. They
are forced to move farther and farther away from urban areas,
because only the rich, politically elite and the new budding
Chinese middle class can afford to live in the large expensive
cities. 167 China is, in essence, subsidizing the rich at the expense
of the poor.168
The present state of affairs in China shows that the relocation
of the poor is not a temporary phase the nation is going through,
nor is it now that uncommon, and has in fact become the norm in
many areas of China.169  Understandably, many displaced
165 See Hung, supra note 20, at 77 (2004) (stating that local governments have control
over the courts' "personnel and financial arrangements"); see also Wilhelm, supra note 13,
at 234-35 ("Inability of the court system to offer solutions to evictees, both because the law
gives them few grounds for action and because the courts lack independence from local
governments. Most evictees turn to political and popular channels of protest, including
petitioning government offices, staging protests, and complaining to the media.").
166 See Junhua Lu, Beijing's Old and Dilapidated Housing Renewal, 14 CITIES 59, 68
(Daniel B. Abramson trans., 1996) (noting developers to have moved urban residents into
suburban areas with compensation, rather than allowing them to live in their original
inner-city neighborhoods by offering them subsidized pricing); see also Phan I, supra note
5, at 641 (specifying the "sole means through which the economically and politically
disadvantaged can carve out a space for themselves" to be "the refusal to sell" their
property).
167 Phan I, supra note 5, at 641 (citing Junhua Lu, Beijing's Old and Dilapidated
Housing Renewal, 14 CITIES 59, 68 (Daniel B. Abramson trans., 1996) (discussing how
development companies have preferred to compensate urban residents and resettle them
into suburban areas, rather than rehouse them at subsidized prices in their original
inner-city neighborhoods).
168 Phan I, supra note 5, at 641 (discussing how the Chinese government in effect
subsidizes the rich at a price that does not factor in the social costs borne by the poor); see
Joseph Kahn, Pace and Scope of Protest in China Accelerated in '05, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 20,
2006, at A10 ("Peasants, migrant workers and former employees of bankrupt state-run
factories in the cities-collectively the overwhelming majority of China's 1.3 billion
people-tended to benefit far less from the prosperity than the budding urban middle
class and the party elite.").
169 See Wilhelm, supra note 13, at 230 ("The present chai qian conflicts are not
merely temporary growing pains or a byproduct of the phasing out of the Maoist state-
supplied housing system, but are becoming a prevalent aspect of China's real estate
market."); see e.g., Desperate Measures: China's Forced Relocations, ECONOMIST 45, Oct.
11, 2003 (stating Shanghai plans to move an additional 400,000 households between 2004
and 2007); Hundreds in Anti-Olympic Protest, HERALD-SUN, Feb. 25, 2004 (stating Beijing
Mayor Wang Qishan said 1.5 million people were relocated in the capital from 1991 to
2003); Old District Rebuilding in Shanghai Benefits 2.5M Households, BUS. DAILY
UPDATE, Aug. 11, 2003 (stating that although no nationwide statistics have been made
public Shanghai has reported relocating 2.5 million people from 850,000 households
between 1990 and 2003).
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Chinese residents are upset, not simply because their land was
taken, nor because of the inadequate compensation, but because
of the shameful process that the government uses to justify the
taking. The process of chai qian or "demolition and relocation"
was the leading cause of public dissatisfaction with the
government in urban areas within the last couple of years.170
Indeed, there has been a steady increase in the amount of
instances of displaced citizens protesting and even in two
extreme cases citizens lit themselves on fire in protest after the
demolition of their homes by the government without adequate
compensation. 171
One illustration of unrest caused when peasant land is
appropriated is when 100,000 residents were displaced in order
to construct the Pubugou Dam in Hanyuan County, Sichuan
Province.' 72  Over 60,000 of these peasants protested by
physically blocking dump trucks as they attempted to begin
construction on the dam. 173 The next day thousands of students
boycotted school and marched on the County government
building.174 The protests turned violent and bloodshed ensued.i 75
170 See Wilhelm, supra note 13, at 229 (stating chai qian has emerged as the leading
cause of public dissatisfaction with government in Chinese cities in 2003); see also Li
Fuyong, Dong Qian Fubai Yinfa Guan Zhu [Relocation and Demolition Corruption
Attracts Attention], CHINA COM. TIMES, Sept. 19, 2003, available at
http://www.realestate.gov.cnnews.asp?recordno=25075&teamno=3&line= lll (stating
chai qian complaints were No. 1 topic of petitions lodged in 2003 with State Letters and
Visits Bureau, a non-judicial channel for airing grievances against government officials at
all levels and in all departments of government and a total of 17,000 chai qian appeals
were made to the office in the first eight months of 2003).
171 See Liu, supra note 2, at 1. On Sept. 15, 2003, a man named Zhu Qingliang poured
gasoline on himself and lit himself on fire in the middle of Tiananmen Square after his
local government seized and destroyed his home. Id. Another man made a similar self
emollition protest in Nanjing three weeks earlier after the government had forcefully
evicted him and his family. Id.
172 See Shi Jiangtao, Peasants in Upstream Fight to Halt Dam Protests by Thousands
of Farmers against the Damming of Dadu River are Not Expected to Turn the Tide, S.
CHINA MORNING POST, Jan. 4, 2005, at 10 ("Plans for the 186-metre high Pubugou
dam.., would see 68,000 sq km of land flooded in Hanyuan and two other neighboring
countries, with up to 100,000 people displaced.").
173 See Gady A. Epstein, Proud of Protest, Silent on Politics Dissent: Farmer's Success
Against a Dam Project Shows the Communist Party's Difficulty Keeping the Lid on, BALT.
SUN, Feb. 13, 2005, at 1A ('The farmers were already resentful at how authorities had
kept them in the dark about the dam's progress, angry that corrupt officials had siphoned
off money for their relocation and distressed by the prospect of resettlement into
poverty.").
174 See Epstein, supra note 174, at 1A (describing how more than 1,000 middle school
pupils marched on the Hanyuan County government building).
175 See id. (describing how at one point a crowd was repelled with tear gas and at the
dam site paramilitary police beat two septuagenarian protesters with batons and the
crowd became furious and attacked the police).
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The Communist Party officials sent in 6000 soldiers from the
People's Armed Police to quell the uprising.176 If that wasn't bad
enough, the government even mandated a nationwide media
blackout to make sure that the rest of its citizens never heard of
the event. 177
Another incident in Dongzhou erupted because of the
construction of a new power plant.178 Farmer's lands were seized
and fisherman believed the new plant would pollute the water.179
Four days after the incident, the official New China News Agency
released the first Chinese account in a report stating that over
300 armed peasants "assaulted the police." 180 It also stated that
the "police were forced to open fire in alarm." 181 That report was
at odds with the stories told by villagers, who insisted that
twenty or more people had been killed by automatic weapon fire
and that at least forty were still missing. 8 2 The government
barred reports in newspapers, banned place names and other
relevant keywords from search engines such as Google.1 83 As any
176 See Survey - India and China: Two Concepts of Liberty?, ECONOMIST, Mar. 27,
2005, at S1 ("In China, goes the argument, the government or party no sooner issues an
order than it is done. A mind-boggling scheme to dam the Yangzi river and generate
electricity at the Three Gorges, involving the forcible resettlement of 1.3m people, the
destruction of priceless cultural relics and the risk of silting, flooding and the nightmare
of an earthquake? No problem.")
177 See Jiangtao, supra note 172, at 10. Due to the sensitive nature of the incident, no
official media covered the protests because mainland authorities feared the threat of
instability. Id. See also Epstein, supra note 174, at 1A (stating that no mainland Chinese
media outlets were allowed to report the story).
178 See Howard W. French, Beijing Casts Net of Silence Over Protest, N.Y. TIMES, Dec.
14, 2005, at A3 (describing how the police violently suppressed a demonstration against
the construction of power plant); see also Richard McGregor, China Police Kill Village
Protesters, FIN. TIMES, Dec. 12, 2005, at 7 (explaining how protestors were demanding
higher compensation for the loss of land that was to make way for the power plant).
179 See Minnie Chan, Villagers Reportedly Shot Dead During Land Dispute;
Protestors Angry Over What They Claim is Unfair Compensation, S. CHINA MORNING
POST, Dec. 8, 2005, at 5. The villagers claimed that if construction went ahead, they would
lose access to Baisha Lake, which they relied on for fish and power generation. Id. See
also Jonathan Watts, Chinese Militia Open Fire on Demonstrators Opposing Coal Plant,
GUARDIAN, Dec. 9, 2005, at 17. Villagers believed that the power plant would result in the
deterioration of air and water quality. Id.
180 French, supra note 178, at A3.
181 Id.
182 Id. (stating that the article itself said that only three villagers were killed and
eight injured and even this was only stated two-thirds of the way into the article); see
Mark Magnier, China Detains Police Official, L.A. TIMES, Dec. 12, 2005, at A3 ("Villagers
reached by phone have said that 10 to 20 farmers were killed and several dozen were
injured or missing.").
183 See Chan, supra note 189, at 5 (mentioning an interview with one villager who
stated that local officials had patrolled the village roads to stop reporters from visiting);
see also French, supra note 180, at A3 ("Users who continued to search found their
browsers freezing. By Tuesday, links to foreign news sources appeared but were
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protest that happens in China, the full story will never be fully
known. In fact, most Chinese do not even know that these
protests even happened.184
China's constitution was amended in 2004 to encompass a
similar theory of the Fifth Amendment of the US Constitution:
that the state may take land "in the public interest" (weile
gonggong liyi).185 While the theory is similar, the application of it
in China is light years from the American model of government
eminent domain takings. 8 6 Unlike how the United States
Constitution decrees that "just compensation" be paid to the
takee, as measured by market value, the Chinese constitution
does not define the level of compensation to be given.18 7 This has
lead to 'many disputes and litigation over the level of
compensation that should be paid.188 The government does not
use a market rate for compensation, but rather has appraisers,
whose interests are further entwined with the developers and the
government, deem the appropriate compensation amount.18 9 In
looking at the compensation amounts, in light of the fact that
individuals do not own the actual land, but merely the right to
use the land, the level of payout is usually pretty small.190 The
invariably inoperative.").
184 See Epstein, supra note 173, at 1A (stating that even the details as to how many
people protested and how many were injured and killed might never be known); see also
French, supra note 179, at A3 (stating that one week after the incident, an overwhelming
majority of the Chinese public still know nothing of the event).
185 See Liu, supra note 2, at 6-7 ("In 2004, a new clause was imbedded in Article 13 of
China's Constitution. According to this new clause, private property may be expropriated
or taken by the state, but the taking has to be for public use and with compensation."); see
also Phan I, supra note 5, at 613 (stating that this provision was amended in 2004 to
provide for compensation in the event of a taking).
186 See Phan I, supra note 5, at 644 (arguing that the American model of takings is
inapplicable to China in that the government structure of China does not utilize the
system of checks and balances that the American government has subscribed to).
187 See Liu, supra note 2, at 6-7 (describing how "[iun 2004, a new clause was
imbedded in Article 13 of China's Constitution. According to this new clause, private
property may be expropriated or taken by the state, but the taking has to be for public use
and with compensation."); see also Phan I, supra note 5, at 639 (comparing the Fifth
Amendment to China's constitutional equivalent).
188 See Liu, supra note 2, at 20 (explaining that "[t]he Demolition Bureau is the only
entity that may arbitrate disputes between residents and developers with regard to
compensation and resettlement.'); see also Phan I, supra note 5, at 639 ("Absent
benchmarks, litigation over compensation terms has become a chaotic endeavor.").
189 See Liu, supra note 2, at 17 (stating these appraisers are anything but
independent and certainly do not want to bite the hand that feeds them); see also
Wilhelm, supra note 13, at 232 (stating that using market value is the only way to ensure
application of an objective standard because that way, self-interested local governments
would not have the power to set compensation levels).
190 See Liu, supra note 2, at 26 ("However, when these buildings are demolished, the
2008] ENTER THE DRAGON'S LAIR
other factor here is that in a socialist state, everything exists to
benefit the nation as a whole, and therefore this renders the
"public interest" test in China moot. 191 Arguably every potential
investment in the country is in the "public interest."
To summarize the prevailing sentiment in China at the
moment: "The common people are furious."192 The scale of unrest
in China at the moment is unbelievable for any country in
peacetime.193 In China right now and since the Communist
takeover in 1949, the rule of the Communist party and the ideals
that it embraces is paramount.194 The policies of the government
rule supreme and when a party policy conflicts with individuals'
rights, the party policy wins every time. 195 When policy is seen as
owners are only compensated under the reduced residential price, rather than the
commercial business price."); see also Phan I, supra note 5, at 640 (stating that another
similarity to the U.S. compensation method, the land or land use rights in the land are
valued at the time of the taking, so the value is pegged not at the potential value of the
land, but the undeveloped value).
191 See Alsen, supra note 2, at 8 (1996) (describing how ultimately, all the laws and
legally-defined rights are subordinate to the overall goals of social and political
development); see also Phan I, supra note 5, at 611 ("In a society such as China's, built
upon Marxist doctrine, the means of production must be controlled by the State in order
for society as a whole to achieve the ideals of communism. The Marxist vision is that the
communist party ... will help lead the masses toward a socialist society in which private
ownership of the means of production is abolished and the economically and politically
dominant thus cease to oppress the working majority.").
192 See Epstein, supra note 173, at IA. This quote comes from a peasant activist who
declined to be identified that the author interviewed. Id. He continued: "The government
has never explained its policy, never held a meeting with the people to explain the
government policy. Whatever they want to make the government policy and wherever
they want to put the common people, they just do it. We cannot negotiate." Id.
193 See Joseph Kahn, Pace and Scope of Protest in China Accelerated in '05, N.Y.
TIMES, Jan. 20, 2006, at 10 ("Unrest has worsened especially quickly in the last several
years because the government has seized millions of acres of rural land, which peasants
can farm but not own, to make way for factories and real estate developments.
Compensation is very low and many peasants say they have no choice but to protest to
win attention for their claims. In 2004, when the country had 74,000 recorded protest
events, 3.76 million people were involved, the police said. They were no figures provided
for the total number of protesters in 2005.").
194 See Alsen, supra note 2, at 7 (stating that "a communist constitution is a tool for
Party rule. The way law is interpreted, implemented and modified is determined on the
basis of the Party's assessment of current conditions."); see also Yujie Gu, Entering the
Chinese Legal Market: A Guide for American Lawyers Interested in Practicing Law in
China, 48 DRAKE L. REV. 173, 183-84 (1999) (explaining how "[tihe state's policy is the
soul of the law. Individual rights are defined by the law, as opposed to the law being
shaped by natural rights.").
195 See Alsen, supra note 2, at 7 ("The supremacy of the Party means that the
Constitution may be overruled, especially when there is a conflict between the actions of
the top party leadership and the formal requirements and procedures prescribed by
law."); see also Gu, supra note 194, at 184 ("Party policies and regulations... have played
a rather significant role in the rule of the Communist Party."); Daphne Huang, The Right
To A Fair Trial in China, 7 PAC. RIM L. & POL'Y J. 171, 186 (1998) ("In order for China to
embrace individual rights, China must revise four thousand years of Confucianist and
socialist values. Following Confucian and socialist tenets, China has historically placed
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more important than law, what significance can any law have? It
is imperative that the government increase the amount of
protection afforded to the poor in rural areas aimed for
development. A law giving them stronger property rights is only
one of the first steps. Moving forward in the PRC, the corruption
in the government needs to be cleaned up, the land seizure
system needs to be subject to independent court review,
government officials need to be evaluated on more factors than
simply the amount of investment that they can bring into their
areas, the concept of "public use" needs to be defined, and when a
taking does occur for a proper reason, the individual needs to be
paid the current market value of their property.
IV. ECONOMIC EFFECTS
A. Foreign Direct Investment (FDI)
The creation of the land use right in 1988 was the catalyst that
sparked a huge surge in the real estate market in China.196
Many land use rights were granted for the construction of hotels,
shopping centers, office buildings and more. 197 Surprisingly, all
of this construction and conversion took place without the
prevalent use of mortgage financing. 198
The lower transaction costs and greater sense of security that
will accompany the implementation of the property rights law
will serve to increase, not only domestic investment but also and
state first, the collective second, and the individual last."); Carrie Menkel-Meadow, The
Ethics 2000 Commission: The Adversary System and the Lawyer-Client Relationship, 70
TENN. L. REV. 63, 70 (2002) ("The goal of deliberative democracy and democratic discourse
is to allow for greater participation by individuals most affected by policy issues or
conflict.").
196 See RANDOLPH & JIANBO, supra note 22, at 19-20 (stating that creation of land use
rights was responsible for making real estate industry become leading industry in China);
see also Ngai Pindell, Fear and Loathing: Combating Speculation in Local Communities,
39 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 543, 544 (2006) ('The rise and fall of housing markets is not a
new phenomenon, but the effects of housing frenzies and slowdowns merit examination
under local governments' power to regulate land use.").
197 See RANDOLPH & JIANBO, supra note 22, at 19 ("New granted land rights were
created for office buildings, luxury hotels and shopping centers.")
198 See id. at 19-20. Most Chinese lenders were weary of security mortgages, and
would not lend on such, preferring to lend on personal guarantees. Also, much of the
investment capital creating such a boom came from equity financing from the "Asian
Tigers": Taiwan and Hong Kong. Id. at 20.
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most importantly, foreign investment.199 When parties can be
confident of their ownership rights in property, they can then
depend on these rights when they use their property in private
transactions. 200 Persons with registered title properly will be able
to use their ownership interests as collateral for loans. After the
implementation of the property rights law, lenders should be
much more willing to accept interests in land as security for
loans amounting up to the fair market value of the property
interest. More secure land ownership rights will therefore lead
to greater amounts of capital flow in the PRC.201
When people have easier access to this source of credit, they
put it back into the economy, further stimulating economic
growth. This will lead to an increase in the general welfare of
China. So while it may seem that the purpose of a property
rights law would be just to benefit the individuals receiving those
rights, it really will allow them to use the value of their property
in order to further the credit attainable to them through
mortgaging, which will increase the credit that can be put back
into the economy.202 As long as the government cuts back some of
199 See Michele Balfour & Cameron Crise, A Privatization Test: The Czech Republic,
Slovakia and Poland, 17 FORDHAM INT'L L.J. 84, 87 (1993) ("A legal system that protects
and enforces property rights will allow owners of property to 'have confidence that they
will obtain returns from the use of property."'); see also Huang, supra note 74, at 195-96
("In such imperfect markets, the costs of impersonal market transactions are actually
higher than transactions conducted through informal social networks. However, as the
market grows and the. transaction costs of market exchanges are lowered, the informal
property regime will give way to a more efficient formal legal system of clearly delineated
property rights that offers more security.").
200 See Brett M. Frischmann & Mark A. Lemley, Spillovers, 107 COLUM L. REV. 257,
271-72 (2007) ("Real and personal property rights systems generally establish strong
ownership rights in the first possessor of such goods."); see also Palomar I, supra note 67,
at 1016 (stating several ways in which individuals use their ownership rights in property
to help in their private transactions).
201 See Zhu Keliang, et al., The Rural Land Question In China: Analysis and
Recommendations Based on a Seventeen-Province Survey, 38 N.Y.U. J. INT'L. L. & POL.
761, 829 (2006) ("Chinese law specifically prohibits farmers from mortgaging their land
rights."); see also Palomar I, supra note 66, at 1015-16 ("In the United States, for example,
seventy percent of the credit extended to new businesses stems from mortgaging real
property titles as collateral for loans.").
202 See Palomar I, supra note 66, at 1018 ("Secure property rights, on the other hand,
encourage holders to invest in their property because of their certainty that the property
will not be usurped. From a strictly economic standpoint, therefore, the true purpose of
property rights is not to benefit the individuals or entities holding those rights, but to give
them the incentive to increase the value of their assets by investing, innovating, or
combining them advantageously with other resources, something which would have
beneficial results for society."); see also Elizabeth L. Warren-Mikes, December Madness:
The Seventh Circuit's Creation of Dual Use in Illinois High School Association v. GTE
Vantage, 93 NW. U. L. REV. 1009, 1019 (1999) (quoting that "the property right function of
trademarks allows companies to securely invest in their products in an attempt to build
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the old socialist doctrine, and does not restrict property
ownership rights or exercise its taking power to the detriment of
the public, and assuming the land registration system does not
create havoc, the new property law will lead to a huge mortgage
market, and in turn to greater wealth and prosperity for the
entire country of China. 203
It is true, to a certain extent, that the mortgage market has
been growing in China for some time now. To accomplish this
without formal property rights, the use of "usufruct" came into
existence. 204 An individual right for a definite term to possess,
manage, use, transfer, and receive income from a parcel of land
can be used as collateral in the same manner that an ownership
right can be.205 However, the fair market value of a usufruct
interest is much lower than the fair market value of the full
bundle of property rights in a parcel of land.206
good will" showing that securing one's property rights, such as in trademarks, will
encourage one to invest in their property because they have some degree of certainty that
their property will not be usurped).
203 See Palomar I, supra note 66, at 1022 ("Individuals finance their purchases with
twenty- or thirty-year home mortgage loans. At this time, the Bank of China finances all
these residential mortgage loans with state money. If, instead of holding all this debt for
twenty or thirty years, the Bank of China could sell packages of thousands of its
residential mortgage loans into the world's securities markets and, thus, make private
capital available for residential mortgage lending, this process could generate trillions in
state resources for the funding of other projects."); see also Graeme Johnston, Reform
Plans Face Uncertainty, FIN. TIMES, Apr. 4, 2006 ("The importance of these issues for
foreign investors cannot be understated. If property and other legal rights are not
protected by an effective and trusted legal process, there are implications not only for
economic growth but also for the development of a healthy and contented society."); Kahn,
supra note 3, at A14 (quoting Zhang Weiying, deputy dean of Guanghua School of
Management at Beijing University and director of several major Chinese companies as
stating "areas of China that had grown the fastest, [were the ones that] opened up the
most to foreign investment and given the widest berth to the private sector had higher
living standards and narrower wealth gaps than areas that clung to socialist controls").
204 Steven E. Hendrix, Property Law Innovation in Latin America with
Recommendations, 18 B.C. INT'L & COMP. L. REV. 1, 9 (1995) ("A usufruct is a civil code
equivalent to a right to use and enjoy the property of another."); Michael R. Newhouse,
Recognizing and Preserving Native American Treaty Usufructs in the Supreme Court: The
Mille Lacs Case, 21 PUB. LAND & RESOURCES L. REV. 169, 193 (2000) (stating that some
people view some usufructs as themselves property rights).
205 See Steven J. Eagle, Private Property, Development and Freedom: On Taking Our
Own Advice, 59 SMU L. REV. 345, 363-64 (2006) (stating that owners of property may take
any actions with respect to their property including using property as collateral); see also
Palomar I, supra note 66, at 1024 ("A private right for a definite term to possess, use,
manage, receive income from, and transfer interests in a parcel of land has market value
for purposes of credit, foreign commercial investment, and securitizing mortgage loans, so
long as those rights are clear, enforceable, and indefeasible, even if the sovereign or the
State retains the fee title.").
206 See Robert C. Ellickson, Property in Land, 102 YALE L.J. 1315, 1367 (1993)
(stating that perpetual private land rights are generally superior to usufructs); see also
Palomar I, supra note 66, at 1023-24 ("[L]oans will not be available even to titled
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While the effect of secure land rights may seem like a great
benefit to the Chinese people, if these property protections are
deemed reliable enough to foreign investors, it will attract huge
amounts of foreign capital.207 In fact this has already begun in
China, and with the solidifying effect of the new property rights
law, it will only further stimulate foreign investment. These
foreign investors will bring new capital into the economy and
provide additional employment and tax revenue. This will allow
the working class people of China - a massive amount of
"human capital"- to have access to new employment
opportunities in corporations that set up new offices and
manufacturing plants in the PRC.208
CONCLUSION
Although the National People's Congress enacted a property
rights law to solidify interests in land, there is much more that
needs to be done in order for the people of China and the country
as a whole to benefit from it. The law that was recently passed is
a start in the right direction but it will not instigate the full
property rights revolution necessary to stabilize the fast rate of
development in China.209 The groups most in need of a full
property rights law, the peasants, will be little helped by the
recently passed law, as it serves to mainly protect the investor's
recently appropriated land.210
landowners if location, size, and value of the parcels involved are inadequate to interest
lenders.").
207 See Palomar I, supra note 66, at 1024 (stating that secure land rights or private
right for definite term to possess, use, manage, receive income from, and transfer
interests in parcels in land can stir foreign investment); see also Bin Xue Sang, Pudong:
Another Special Economic Zone in China?- An Analysis of the Special Regulations and
Policy for Shanghai's Pudong New Area, 14 NW. J. INT'L L. & BUS. 130, 143-44 (1993)
("[A]lthough China is a socialist country and as such does not recognize private land
ownership, land use rights will no longer be a problem for foreign investors who
contemplate doing business in China.").
208 See Valedictory: A Long Goodbye, ECONOMIST, Apr. 1, 2006 ("The huge expansion
of the global labour force represented by the liberalisation of China and India has held
down the incomes of the unskilled in all countries; the spread of information technology
has had the same effect. The politics of that inequality is finding expression in the rise of
economic nationalism in Europe and America."); see also Mark Landler and Keith
Bradsher, Airbus, China and Quid Pro Quo; The Giant of Aviation Markets Seems Just
the Place to Put a Factory, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 15, 2006, at C1 (stating that Airbus is looking
to build assembly lines in China, and that could lead to many employment opportunities
for Chinese people).
209 See China's next revolution, ECONOMIST, Mar. 10, 2007, at 9.
210 Id. (stating that "[m]uch good land has already been grabbed, and the new law
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The PRC government must ensure that property rights of both
domestic and foreign businesses and private individuals are
strong enough to withstand China's bullish economic rush into
the free market economy. The new property rights law must
protect the land use rights that parties currently possess, it must
give further restrictions on the governments taking power, it
must clear up the registration system, and allow for mortgages
and free transferability. In order to fully implement the law, the
government needs more transparency, more integrity from local
officials, and more centralization. China's economic reforms need
to take a back seat for once and allow for their political and legal
reforms to catch up.
Deng Xiaoping's goal of "socialism with Chinese
characteristics" was for government ownership to dwindle and
foreign investment to rise in order to create a stable market
economic system.211 China is headed in the right direction,
government ownership is dwindling and foreign investment is
rising. The Chinese market economy is booming. However, it
seems that most members of the lower class in China would
agree that this new "socialism with Chinese characteristics" feels
a lot more like capitalism, albeit corrupted, than anything
resembling socialism, no matter what the Communist Party
members in Beijing have to say about it. Call it what you will,
the benefits of economic expansion are numerous and China's
growth rate cannot be discounted. But can the frenetic pace be
sustained without more legal reform?
will merely protect the grabber's gains.").
211 See China: The White Peril, ECONOMIST, Apr. 1, 2006. Deng Xiaoping argued, "the
[Communist] party's survival depended on economic growth." He believed that this
growth "could only be delivered by opening China wider to foreign investment and
breaking the state's grip on the economy." Currently China's leadership has been talking
about steering the country away from a blind pursuit of growth and paying more
attention to the concerns of the marginalized. But it shows no desire to abandon Deng's
formula for success." Id. China's future success depends upon foreign investment.
Graham, supra note 81, at 269-70.
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